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 Security, Conflict and Cooperation
in the Contemporary World

Britain and the

Dictatorships of Argentina
and Chile, 1973-82
Foreign Policy, Corporations
and Social Movements

GRACE LIVINGSTONE
Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the
Contemporary World

Series Editors
Effie G. H. Pedaliu
LSE Ideas
London, UK

John W. Young
University of Nottingham
Nottingham, UK
The Palgrave Macmillan series, Security, Conflict and Cooperation in
the Contemporary World aims to make a significant contribution to
academic and policy debates on cooperation, conflict and security since
1900. It evolved from the series Global Conflict and Security edited by
Professor Saki Ruth Dockrill. The current series welcomes proposals that
offer innovative historical perspectives, based on archival evidence and
promoting an empirical understanding of economic and political coop-
eration, conflict and security, peace-making, diplomacy, humanitarian
intervention, nation-building, intelligence, terrorism, the influence of
ideology and religion on international relations, as well as the work of
international organisations and non-governmental organisations.

More information about this series at

http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14489
 Grace Livingstone

Britain and the

Dictatorships of
Argentina and Chile,
1973–82
Foreign Policy, Corporations
and Social Movements
Grace Livingstone
Centre of Latin American Studies
University of Cambridge
Cambridge, UK

Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World

ISBN 978-3-319-78291-1 ISBN 978-3-319-78292-8 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78292-8

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018936594

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights
of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction
on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and
retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and
information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication.
Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied,
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Printed on acid-free paper

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The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
“The book is constructed by pioneering research of outstanding quality. It places
British foreign policy of the 1970s in a quite new and questionable light.”
—David Rock, Emeritus Professor of History, University of California, USA,
author of Argentina 1516–1987: From Spanish Colonization to Alfonsin

“Grace Livingstone provides a brilliantly original analysis of UK-Latin American

relations prior to the Falklands conflict. Her investigations into recently released
archives yield many important insights into the often murky fields of arms sales,
the politics of oil, and violations of human rights. Livingstone also develops orig-
inal and illuminating theoretical perspectives on her subject. Scholarly, compel-
ling and intellectually sophisticated, this book is outstanding.”
—John Dumbrell, Emeritus Professor of Government, Durham University, UK

“Meticulously researched, well-written and very convincing, this book is an

authoritative account of the making of British foreign policy towards the mil-
itary regimes of Argentina and Chile. It is an indispensable study of how both
Conservative and Labour governments tried to balance the competing forces
attempting to influence the policy-making process. I cannot recommend it too
highly.”
—Alan Angell, Emeritus Fellow, St Antony’s College, Oxford, UK

“In this major new study, Grace Livingstone contrasts the way in which British
Governments treated the military dictatorships in Chile and Argentina during the
1970s and 1980s, examining the conflicts between ministers and officials, and
the role of public opinion. It is an absorbing read which illuminates some dark
corners of British foreign policy.”
—Andrew Gamble, Professor of Politics, University of Sheffield, UK

“This is an exhaustive exploration of British National Archives covering

Pinochet’s coup in Chile in 1973 and the Argentine coup of 1976 leading to the
South Atlantic conflict in 1982. The resulting book provides a detailed analysis
of British foreign policy-making towards Chile and Argentina in the Cold War
years. The focus is on the diverging and contrasting attitudes of both Labour and
Conservative governments when dealing with Chile and Argentina. All in all, this
book is a must read for those interested in international relations, in the making
of British foreign policy, and in understanding the context that led to the 1982
conflict.”
—Celia Szusterman, The Institute for Statecraft, UK

“Grace Livingstone’s work marks an important contribution to the study of

British policy toward Latin America. Examining the informal networks of a wide
range of actors, from civil servants and politicians to business leaders and interest
groups, it demonstrates how the social class of officials influenced the policymak-
ing process.”
—Aaron Donaghy, EU Marie Skłodowska-Curie Global Fellow,
Harvard University, USA

“Grace Livingstone’s meticulous and detailed work to unearth and document the
execrable position of the FCO, its desk officers, section heads and embassy staff,
is wonderful. This book takes us behind the scenes to see how Foreign Office
ambassadors and civil service respond to and seek to mould the policies of gov-
ernments—nowhere more so than in their response to the 1973 military coup
in Chile. Conservatives wanted business as usual, Labour wanted an ethical for-
eign policy. Human rights campaigners wanted something stronger. Here, in tel-
egrams and briefing memos, you can see how it all played out. Grace Livingstone
has added a vital and previously missing component to our understanding of the
period.”
—Mike Gatehouse, former joint-secretary of the Chile Solidarity Campaign
 Contents

1 Introduction: Making Friends With the Junta 1

2 Chile 1973–1982 35

3 Welcoming Pinochet’s Coup (1973–1974) 45

4 Ethical Foreign Policy? Labour Versus the Foreign

Office (1974–1979) 57

5 Tea with a Dictator: Mrs. Thatcher

and the General (1979–1982) 85

6 Chile Conclusion 115

7 Argentina 1976–2 April 1982 121

8 Business as Usual: Arming the Junta (1976–1979) 129

9 Oil, the Islands and the Falklands Lobby (1976–1979) 161

10 Befriending ‘Common or Garden’ Dictators

(1979 to 2 April 1982) 181

vii
viii    Contents

11 Antarctica, Oil and Leaseback: Britain’s Strategic

Interests in the Falklands (1979 to 2 April 1982) 205

12 Conclusion 233

Appendix A 241

Appendix B 243

Appendix C 249

Bibliography 253

Index 271
 List of Tables

Table 9.1 Anglo-Argentine negotiations on the Falkland Islands

1966–1982 163
Table 9.2 British oil exploration around the Falkland Islands
since 1982 170
Table 10.1 British interests in Argentina in 1981 according to the FCO 184
Table 10.2 British arms sales to Argentina 1967–1982 195
Table 10.3 Major defence items agreed by British ministers for sale
to Argentina 1980–1982 which were either not bought
by that country or were not delivered 196
Table 11.1 Anglo-Argentine talks on the Falkland Islands 1979–1982 207
Table 11.2 The Falkland Islanders and British citizenship 225

ix
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Making Friends

With the Junta

While researching this book I interviewed a former minister in the

Thatcher government. As we sat in his private members club, sipping tea
and balancing biscuits on delicate china saucers, he told me that British
ministers had given little thought to the human rights abuses being com-
mitted by the Argentine dictatorship in the years before the Falklands
war. It was the Cold War he reminded me. I was surprised and impressed
by his frankness, but when I wrote to him afterwards asking for permis-
sion to cite his exact words, he refused and instead supplied me with an
anodyne quote which bore little relation to his previous remarks.
Interviewees can be unreliable sources for historians. It is hard for
anyone to remember accurately events from decades before. Politicians,
especially, can be prone to embellish or omit facts to ensure that they are
remembered in the best possible light. But after a war, the temptation
to embroider or erase is particularly great. It is therefore vital that we go
back to the contemporary records to find out what government ministers
and officials actually said at the time.
Using the newly-opened British government papers at the National
Archives, this book looks at Britain’s relations with the Argentine dicta-
torship that came to power in 1976. It not only gives the most complete
picture of British arms sales to the regime, providing evidence that minis-
ters violated their own guidelines on human rights, but also outlines the
political and military links between Britain and the junta. Neither Labour
nor Conservative governments imposed any sanctions on the Argentine

© The Author(s) 2018 1

G. Livingstone, Britain and the Dictatorships of Argentina and Chile,
1973–82, Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78292-8_1
2 G. LIVINGSTONE

military government before the invasion of the Falkland Islands in 1982.

Both governments promoted trade and sold military hardware that was
later used against British forces.
In contrast, the Labour governments of Harold Wilson and James
Callaghan (1974–1979) imposed a series of measures against the regime
of General Augusto Pinochet in Chile that represented an early example
of an ‘ethical’ foreign policy—an arms embargo, a refugee programme,
the cutting of export credits and the withdrawal of the British ambas-
sador. These measures were overturned when Margaret Thatcher’s
Conservative government came to power in 1979. While the British
labour movement barely noticed the coup in Argentina in 1976, it had
been horrified when Hawker Hunter planes bombed the Chilean pres-
idential palace on 11 September 1973. Thirty years later, the Chilean
coup still aroused passionate divisions among British politicians.
Speaking to the Labour Party conference in 1999, Tony Blair confessed
that he found General Pinochet ‘unspeakable’, while Peter Mandelson,
an architect of New Labour, which sought to eradicate naïve leftism
from the party’s ideology, declared that it would be ‘gut-wrenching’ if
the former Chilean dictator evaded extradition to Spain.1 Former Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher and her ex-chancellor Norman Lamont,
meanwhile, spoke out in defence of Pinochet as a ‘friend of Britain’.
The opening of the archives has also made it possible to investigate
whether the British government had economic or strategic reasons for
retaining sovereignty over the Falkland Islands—a longstanding debate
between Argentine and British academics and politicians. While the doc-
umentary record suggests that fear of a domestic political outcry over
‘selling-out’ the Islanders was the primary reason British politicians failed
to reach a sovereignty deal with Argentina in this period, the evidence
presented here shows that the British government and British oil com-
panies were very interested in exploiting the oil in the waters around
the Islands and that whenever cabinet ministers discussed the Falklands
dispute, securing Britain’s access to the hydrocarbon and other marine
resources was part of the calculations. This book also presents exclusive
evidence that, during the Falklands War, ministers feared that losing the
Islands could set a precedent for Britain’s territorial claim in Antarctica.
But this is not a history of the Falklands dispute, nor is it simply
an account of Britain’s relations with two South American dictator-
ships; it is an investigation into the making of foreign policy. Taking an
inter-disciplinary approach, it assesses the factors that influence pol-
icy-makers and considers the role of private companies and banks,
 1 INTRODUCTION: MAKING FRIENDS WITH THE JUNTA 3

politicians and party ideology, and the media. It gauges the extent to
which human right groups, solidarity campaigns and other social move-
ments can have an impact on policy.
The attitudes of British diplomats and officials are also looked
at closely. British diplomats welcomed the coups in both Chile and
Argentina and sought to dissuade Labour ministers from taking any
type of sanction against the military regimes. In this Cold War period,
they were profoundly suspicious of radicalism both at home and abroad.
British business leaders shared these attitudes and were critical of any
policies that might ‘sour the atmosphere’ for those who wished to
invest or trade with these dictatorships. This book examines the nar-
row social background of British officials and traces the informal social
networks between diplomats, officials, business leaders, and other influ-
ential figures such as newspaper editors, peers and Conservative poli­
ticians. It argues that theoretical approaches to foreign policy-making
should not ignore the social class of state officials nor the social context
in which they operate. Similarly, when analysing how social movements
can influence policy, it is important to consider the existing biases of
policy-makers and their informal links to the private sector or other
influential societal groups.
One of the central themes of this work is the extent to which elected
politicians have the freedom to implement policy and how far they are
constrained by external factors: the agency-structure debate. One of
the main divisions among international relations theorists is between
those who focus on relationships between states and those who think
it important to look at how decisions are made within states. Informed
by foreign policy analysts who seek to ‘open the black box’ of the deci-
sion-making process, this study looks closely at how policy is made.2
While acknowledging that policy-makers may be constrained by systemic
factors, it accepts that there is, in Christopher Hill’s words, a ‘decisional
space’ in which politicians can choose between different policy options
or, as Gaskarth has put it: ‘The British government retains the capacity
to make political choices and these decisions have important effects.’3 It
accepts too, as Carlsnaes notes, that neither the individual (the national
politician) nor the structure (the international area) is an immutable sep-
arate entity: each continually influences and shapes the other.4 The book
is based on the premise that the state remains a legitimate focus of study
for understanding international relations, despite the growth of transna-
tional organisations, such as multinational corporations or international
4 G. LIVINGSTONE

non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Certainly, during the period

under study—the 1970s and 1980s—and to a large extent today, nation
states retain a capacity to shape the rules of the international game,
formu­lating policies on key areas such as trade, tax and immigration.5
A politician may have the freedom to make foreign-policy choices
within the constraints of international circumstances, but there is another
aspect of the agency-structure debate that is looked at more closely in
these pages and that is the extent to which a politician is able to pursue
his or her chosen policies in the face of bureaucratic opposition from the
civil service. Or to put it another way, it asks who makes policy: the dem-
ocratically-elected politician or the appointed official? David Vital, for
example, once suggested that the very excellence of the Foreign Office
bureaucratic machine, its efficiency and its competence, made its influ-
ence so formidable that the role of any Cabinet or Foreign Secretary
could become marginal.6 The question has been of particular interest to
the left wing of the Labour party which, from Harold Laski and Stafford
Cripps in the 1930s to Richard Crossman and Tony Benn in the 1960s
and 1970s, has long held the suspicion that a conservative civil service
will seek to undermine left-wing governments.7 Crossman’s diaries were
one of the sources of the BBC TV comedy Yes Minister, which portrayed
Machiavellian civil servants as the real power behind the throne.
Foreign Office documents show that Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (FCO) officials welcomed the overthrow of the socialist presi-
dent of Chile, Salvador Allende, and were critical of British activists and
Labour politicians who campaigned against the coup. Thus, the election
of a Labour government determined to take radical measures against the
Pinochet regime provides an opportunity to examine the power of the
elected politician versus the bureaucrat. The governments of Edward
Heath and Margaret Thatcher shared with the Foreign Office a similar
attitude towards the Pinochet regime, so there was little debate or antag-
onism between politicians and officials on policy towards Chile and there
is therefore little scope to examine the power of the politician against the
bureaucratic machine during those Conservative administrations.
In the case of Argentina, Labour did not seek to introduce tough
sanctions against the junta, so once again there was less conflict in the
policy-making process, although whenever Labour politicians did
consider taking measures on human rights, the Foreign Office advo-
cated moderation, warning of the risks to commercial and polit-
ical relations. The politician versus bureaucrat debate does arise in the
 1 INTRODUCTION: MAKING FRIENDS WITH THE JUNTA 5

context of Argentina, however, as some British politicians and histo-

rians have accused the Foreign Office of pursuing, in an underhand
manner, policies that were aimed at transferring the sovereignty of the
Falkland Islands to Argentina, against the wishes of both Labour and
Conservative governments. This claim is explored and judged to be
unfounded.
One of the central propositions of this book is that the attitudes of
British diplomats and state officials reflected, at least in part, their
social class: their upbringing, education, their socio-economic and cul-
tural status, and the social circles in which they moved. Theorists of
Foreign Policy Analysis—the sub-set of international relations which
has looked most closely at the decision-making process—have consid-
ered many attributes that might affect the decisions of policy-makers,
including their psychology, their belief systems and the political culture
in which they operate. Much useful work has been done on the func-
tioning of bureaucracies, their structures, inter-departmental rivalries and
the nuances of group dynamics.8 But social class is a factor that has been
overlooked.9
The ‘critical’ approach to foreign policy-making proposed by Dunne,
Hadfield and Smith, which emphasises the need to look at both agency
and structure, and advocates a theoretically-informed reading of the pri-
mary sources, could allow for the class background and informal social
networks of state officials to be considered; however the case studies in
their collection have not done so.10
There is a neo-Gramscian critique of international relations, follow-
ing the work of Robert Cox, which introduces the idea of class and class
conflict into the field of international relations; however, this work has
been largely theoretical, rather than empirically or historically based,
and it focuses on the international level rather than the national deci-
sion-making process.11 Marxist-inspired dependency theorists, mean-
while, did seek to study class formation in both the metropolis and the
periphery, but the state and decision-making were not their main focus
of study.12 If it is accepted, however, that national governments have
the power to shape the framework within which countries interact and
within which private companies operate, then the study of the deci-
sion-making process is a crucial question for those interested in power
and social class. And by taking account of the social context in which
these decisions are made, we can begin to identify the individuals or soci-
etal groups which have most influence on policy—accepting, of course,
6 G. LIVINGSTONE

that these state-societal relations will vary in different historical periods

and from country to country.
The Foreign Office has long drawn its recruits from a narrow stra-
tum of society. Originally recruited from the aristocracy, by the end of
the nineteenth century, officials were increasingly being drawn from the
class which Cain and Hopkins have described as ‘gentlemanly capital-
ists’, consisting of landowners and rich professionals from the fields of
finance, law or other services who had re-invested in land and through
their wealth, inter-marriage and public-school education had been ele-
vated into the social elite.13 This southern-centred elite, which dom-
inated the ancient universities, the civil service, the armed forces, the
church, the City and the major professions, was socially separate from,
and may have looked down upon, the manufacturing magnates of the
great northern cities such as Manchester and Liverpool. However, after
the Second World War, the financial and industrial elites became more
socially intertwined, as the City became more involved in financing large
scale industry, as corporations became more important wealth creators
than individuals, as productive manufacturing businesses came under the
control of banks, and as industrialists themselves invested in land and
adopted the lifestyle of the ‘gentlemanly capitalists’.14 One illustration of
this social transformation is the change in careers of Oxford graduates: in
1917 no graduate went into industry or commerce (all were employed
in education or public service), whereas by 1958, as many as 50% found
employment within industrial or commercial firms.15
Labour party intellectual Harold Laski memorably described the
Foreign Office in the 1930s as a ‘nest of public school singing birds’,
and throughout the twentieth century, the proportion of recruits who
attended fee-paying schools remained high, despite the reforms fol-
lowing the Fulton Report of 1968, which aimed to make it easier for
people from humbler backgrounds to reach top jobs in the diplomatic
service.16 In the period 1950–1954, 83% of recruits to the Foreign
Office had attended private school. Ten years later, the proportion had
fallen to 68%; but the figure for the top-ranking posts was higher: more
than 80% of ambassadors and senior FCO officials in 1961 had attended
fee-paying schools (and these public-school educated ambassadors took
all the most prestigious postings, such as Paris, Berlin and New York).17
Even by 1993, 66% of the fast-track entrants to the FCO—those des-
tined for the top posts—had attended public school.18 They were also
overwhelmingly male: in 1991, only 3.4% of the top grades in the
 1 INTRODUCTION: MAKING FRIENDS WITH THE JUNTA 7

FCO were women, which added to the clubbish nature of the Foreign
Office.19 A survey conducted for this book of diplomats dealing with
policy towards Argentina and Chile in the 1970s and 1980s found that
more than 75% had attended fee-paying schools.20 Most Foreign Office
officials were also graduates of Oxford or Cambridge; in 1966, 84% of
successful applicants for the diplomatic service came from these two uni-
versities; by 1989, this had fallen only slightly to 73%.21 When a senior
diplomat claimed in 1977 that recruitment to the Diplomatic Service was
wide open, Labour MP Neville Sandelson retorted: ‘Like the Ritz’.22
While few deny that FCO officials are recruited from a narrow social
base, Theakston and others have argued that it is hard to draw a straight-
forward connection between diplomats’ class backgrounds and their
views.23 Certainly, a number of caveats need to be made. Working class
Jim Callaghan got on better with FCO officials than the young mid-
dle-class upstart David Owen, although Callaghan did make sure he
distributed Labour Party manifestos to FCO staff on becoming Foreign
Secretary.24 Similarly trade unionist Ernest Bevin—who liked to boast
that he was educated ‘in the hedgerows of experience’—was well-re-
spected, even loved, by the FCO, while aristocrat Tony Benn was always
highly suspicious of the civil service.25 So clearly social class—particularly
that of a single individual—cannot be the only indicator of a person’s
views and cannot be the only indicator worth evaluating.
There was also a range of views among FCO officials, although this
remained within a narrow spectrum from conservative to conservatively
moderate and all new recruits imbibed the ethos of gentlemanly capital-
ism that permeated the institution. But, the Foreign Office always kept
a certain autonomy; diplomats prided themselves on seeing the ‘overall
picture’ and certainly did not act as the ‘arm’ of the business-­owning
class. In fact, other government departments, such as the Ministry of
Defence sales section, had a much closer relationship with the private
sector, sometimes acting as virtual lobbyists for arms companies and
chafing against any restrictions on sales opportunities. The Departments
of Energy and Trade also had close links with the oil and manufacturing
companies. To some extent, the FCO saw itself as an arbitrator between
departments and these bureaucratic rivalries—or differences of institu-
tional perspective—are explored throughout the work.
It should also be emphasised that Foreign Office attitudes evolved
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as the social composition
of recruits changed. Otte, who accepts that the mindset of officials did
8 G. LIVINGSTONE

reflect their social class and, in particular, their public-school education,

concluded in his study of the nineteenth-century: ‘Foreign Office Mind’
that it was elitist, non-intellectual, had a strong code of honour and a
belief in public service. While it understood that security underpinned
Britain’s status in the world, it concentrated on political aspects of policy
and did not narrowly reflect the financial or commercial interests of the
class from which it came.26 Jones too emphasises the nineteenth-century
British diplomat’s reluctance to become a direct advocate of British mer-
chants and bankers in Argentina.27 The Foreign Office ‘mind’ may have
changed again in the late twentieth century as the recruitment base wid-
ened and Britain’s manufacturing sector shrank. But this study suggests
that in the decades following the Second World War, the Foreign Office
shared the business community’s outlook that trade and investment
should be promoted regardless of the nature of the recipient regime, and
shows that many diplomats—and businessmen—thought military gov-
ernments were beneficial for British business because they brought sta-
bility. Did this view reflect the class outlook of diplomats? A number of
objections may be made. Firstly, most of the population shared the view
that promoting British exports was in the national interest; it was the
hegemonic view, and certainly Labour ministers—particularly the min-
isters for employment, trade and industry—argued vigorously for trade
with the Argentine military regime. Another objection is that it was the
job of the Foreign Office to promote trade. At least since the nineteenth
century, one of the aims of British foreign policy had been to ensure
security for British trading interests. It was a short step from protec-
tion to promotion and the Committee on Overseas Representation (the
Duncan Committee) in 1969 specifically urged diplomats to promote
British business abroad, leading to complaints that ambassadors were to
become little more than ‘travelling salesmen’.28 In this post-war period,
it was a central objective of successive British governments to avoid bal-
ance of payments deficits and the dangers to sterling that these could
bring. Securing contracts to protect British manufacturing jobs was also
an important concern.
In the case of Chile, however, when a class-conscious trade union
movement at the height of its militancy in the 1970s, backed by Labour
politicians, demanded action against the Pinochet regime, there was a
clear difference between the outlook of Foreign Office officials and the
labour movement, and this may be attributed to differing class outlooks.
The Foreign Office favoured stability over radicalism, criticising the
 1 INTRODUCTION: MAKING FRIENDS WITH THE JUNTA 9

chaos under Allende and predicting that the Pinochet regime would be
better for British business. The FCO was staunchly anti-Communist in
this Cold War period; many officials were critical of human rights cam-
paigners and Chile Solidarity activists, suspecting that they had underly-
ing ‘political’ motives, by which they meant left-wing or pro-Communist
objectives. The Foreign Office believed that Britain’s commercial inter-
ests should be put above ethical considerations and were against end-
ing arms sales, cutting export credits and withdrawing the British
ambassador.
There was less of a clash of views between the labour movement
and Whitehall in the case of Argentina, because the left had not taken
up Argentina as a cause in the same way. The Labour Party regarded
Peronism as akin to fascism and did not mourn the overthrow of the cor-
rupt and repressive government presided over by Juan Perón’s widow.
Chile, on the other hand, was viewed as a clear-cut case of a democrati-
cally-elected socialist being ousted by a fascist dictator. Nevertheless, the
pro-business attitude of the Foreign Office can be seen in its consistent
advocacy of closer commercial ties with the Argentina junta, despite the
growing awareness of the gross human rights abuses being perpetrated
by the regime. Indeed, in the absence of a strong lobby, the de facto
policy of the Foreign Office towards all the military regimes of South
America, including Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay, was to
impose no sanctions and to continue to promote trade, including arms
sales. Britain had a particularly strong relationship with the military
regime of Brazil, inviting dictator General Ernesto Geisel on a state visit
in 1976 and providing the Brazilian armed forces with British military
training manuals.29
Henry Fairlie, the Spectator journalist who coined the phrase ‘the
Establishment’ wrote: ‘By its traditions and its methods of recruitment
the Foreign Office makes it inevitable that the members of the Foreign
Service will be men…who “know all the right people”.’30 Using pri-
mary sources, this study traces the informal social networks between
Foreign Office officials and business leaders, financial executives, news-
paper editors and some Conservative politicians. They were often mem-
bers of the same private clubs—such as the Athenaeum in Pall Mall or
the Carlton in St. James’s Street—and they attended the same seminars,
lunches and drinks parties in Belgravia. Business executives had numer-
ous informal channels of access to the Foreign Office; officials regu-
larly reported conversations with representatives of—for example BP,
10 G. LIVINGSTONE

Rothschild or GEC—whom they had met at a function or had spoken

to on the phone. This elite often shared a common social and educa-
tional background, having attended the same universities and fee-paying
schools, and bought property in similarly wealthy parts of cities or afflu-
ent villages. They often had common cultural interests, reading the same
newspapers or following the same sports, such as horse racing or cricket.
These repeated informal and semi-formal encounters therefore had a
dual role, reinforcing existing social and political affinities, as well as giv-
ing private sector representatives direct access to policy-makers.
Ambassadors and embassy staff in Chile and Argentina socialised in
an even more tightly-knit social milieu, comprising the British business
community, many of whom were virulently right wing and in favour of
military rule, along with upper-class Argentines and Chileans, including
military officers. Embassy functions, drinks funded by private companies,
polo matches, dinner parties, as well as the more formal tasks of host-
ing trade missions or meeting Argentine or Chilean government officials,
were all part of the British diplomat’s life in South America. The com-
mon upbringing and education, socio-economic status and social con-
nections, may not have been the only factors determining the views of
Foreign Office officials, but there is a strong case for arguing they con-
tributed to the convergence of views between the Foreign Office and
Britain’s financial and commercial elites. Certainly, the Foreign Office,
as an institution, articulated a conception of the ‘national interest’ which
reflected the interests of the dominant industrial, financial, professional
and landed groups of post-war Britain.
The term elite has been used loosely in this work to describe individ-
uals who hold economic or political power, including the executives of
large private companies and financial institutions, people who hold great
personal wealth or land, government ministers, influential back-benchers,
peers, the monarchy, editors of influential broadsheets, magazines and
broadcasting companies, and those populating the higher ranks of the
civil and foreign service, the military, the judiciary and the Church of
England. The language of elites sits uneasily with that of class, the two
coming from distinct intellectual traditions. Certainly, elite is not used
here with any of the normative connotations of the early elite theorists,
Mosca and Pareto, who saw elitism as both inevitable and necessary in
all societies.31 But viewing the elite as the people within a class who are
most active in public life, or who act on behalf of powerful economic
sectors, is not necessarily incompatible with a class-based analysis.32
 1 INTRODUCTION: MAKING FRIENDS WITH THE JUNTA 11

It is not suggested here that members of the elite coordinated

their actions in a conspiratorial way, rather that the elite shared an
anti-­egalitarian, pro-business outlook in this post-war period, which in
foreign-policy terms translated into the promotion of British manufac-
turing and financial interests abroad.
However a simple binary opposition between the class outlook of
the labour movement and that of the pro-business elite—while use-
ful to describe differing perspectives on the Pinochet regime—has not
been found adequate to describe the political debates on the Falkland
Islands during the 1970s and 1980s, not least because the trade union
movement and the Labour Left had no coherent position on the sov-
ereignty dispute. Political divisions on the Falklands, particularly during
the Thatcher years, are best ascribed to splits within the elite and these
are analysed in the final chapter of this book.

Social Movements and Policy-Making

This study also looks at the circumstances in which non-­parliamentary
campaigning groups can be successful. It explores why the Chile
Solidarity Campaign had a much wider appeal than the groups lobby-
ing for human rights in Argentina. It also considers the impact of the
Falkland Islands Committee, an organisation that campaigned for the
rights of Falkland Islanders. The two political science approaches that
look most closely at how social movements can influence policy-making
are political process theory, which uses the concept of ‘political oppor-
tunity structures’, and the veto-player/gate-keeper approach, which is
derived from game theory.33 The merit of these approaches is that they
examine the nature of the governing structures and do not just consider
the characteristics of the campaigning organisations. In Guigni’s terms,
both the ‘external’ and ‘internal’ are considered.34 While there are a
number of factors which help determine the success of a social move-
ment, including the clarity of its message, the breadth of its appeal and
its tactics and strategies, it is arguably crucial for a lobbying organisation
to have some sort of leverage over key policy-makers (or ‘gate-keepers’).
So, for example, the Chile Solidarity Campaign successfully persuaded
the Labour government to impose sanctions on the Pinochet dictator-
ship because it not only had the support of sympathetic ministers, but
also had institutional links to the government through both the party
and the trade unions. Its leverage was particularly strong because Labour
12 G. LIVINGSTONE

held only a small majority, then a minority, of seats in parliament. The

Chile campaign had less influence on the Thatcher administration
because it had no supporters in cabinet and no institutional links to the
governing Conservative party, which had a large majority in parliament.
But neither political process theory nor the gate-keeper approach
analyses the social context in which policy is made, so do not consider
the potential biases of state officials stemming from their social class or
their informal social networks. Political process theorists have considered
a range of variables, including the relative repressiveness of a regime, its
openness to new actors and the multiplicity of power centres within in
it.35 Some have adopted a narrower focus on institutional arrangements
and compare features such as: federalism versus centralism, the electoral
system, the relationship between the legislature, executive and judiciary
and availability of referenda.36 But the role of state officials and their
biases has not been considered. The veto-player approach has considered
the role of unelected officials, suggesting that they will have more auton-
omy when there are more key policy-makers (veto-players), because as
the number of veto-players increases, the chain of command becomes
less clear and officials may play ministers off against each other.37 There
is no attempt, however, to discern the preferences or motives of officials;
unsurprisingly because in game theory all actors are divorced from their
social context and are ultimately reducible to quantifiable variables.
The actions of state officials may not always be the factor which
determines whether a social movement is successful. However, over-
looking the social matrix in which officials operate risks underestimat-
ing the resistance to campaigners’ demands from the state machinery
and the subtle ways in which officials try to dissuade ministers from
taking action. In the case of a weak lobby group, such as the Argentina
human rights campaign, the result was that no sanctions were imposed
and business links with the military regime were pursued. Even in the
case of a strong campaign, such as Chile, policy-making was a constant
process of negotiation between FCO officials, who advised caution, and
ministers, who were in turn under pressure from their base. While the
Labour government did succeed in introducing a policy that was radi-
cally different from that of its Conservative predecessors, officials suc-
cessfully persuaded ministers against taking the most extreme measures
demanded by activists such as the breaking of existing arms contracts
with the Pinochet regime. Meanwhile, the Falkland Island Committee,
which had the support of influential figures such as peers, high-ranking
former military officers and business leaders, had enhanced social access
 1 INTRODUCTION: MAKING FRIENDS WITH THE JUNTA 13

to policy-makers; for example its supporters hosted private dinners and

drinks parties for FCO officials and the campaign’s secretary belonged
to the same private club as the head of the FCO’s Falkland Island
Department (see Chapter 5). This informal social nexus, complemented
its more traditional lobbying techniques such as writing to MPs. By tak-
ing an inter-disciplinary approach, using the methods of a social histo-
rian and reading the primary sources critically, this study aims to show
that officials cannot be regarded as neutral players and that their attitudes
and social networks must be taken into account when analysing deci-
sion-making in government.

Informal Empire
‘And so behold! The New World established and if we do not throw it
away, ours’, proclaimed Foreign Secretary George Canning in 1825.38
Britain became the dominant economic power in Latin America in
the nineteenth century until it was superseded by the United States from
1900 onwards. Britain controlled almost a third of Latin America’s trade
in 1870 and, by 1913, 50% of all foreign investment in Latin America
came from Britain.39 Even these figures mask the greater relative eco-
nomic weight Britain had in the Southern Cone economies of Brazil,
Chile and Argentina, where British companies and investors built rail-
ways, held controlling shares in banks and public utilities, had large hold-
ings of government bonds and bought substantial amounts of land. In
Chile, British companies controlled the lucrative nitrate-mining indus-
tries, while in Argentina they dominated the banks, transport industry
and import trade. In both Argentina and Chile, there was often a conver-
gence of interests between the British and Latin American landed elite,
who favoured free trade and welcomed foreign investment. The British
did not create this elite—it was a legacy of Spanish colonialism—but
they did help to strengthen it and ensure that it remained dominant for
longer than might otherwise have been the case.
The British dominance of the economy of Latin America, and in par-
ticular Argentina, has led to a debate about the extent to which Britain
profited at the expense of Latin Americans and distorted Latin America’s
development path. Robinson and Gallagher argued that Argentina was
part of Britain’s ‘informal empire’, exploited economically like a colony
but through informal means.40 Some historians, such as H. S. Ferns,
rejected this argument on the grounds that the relationship was mutu-
ally beneficial to Britain and Argentina.41 But while there may have been
14 G. LIVINGSTONE

a convergence of interests between the Argentine elite and the British

in the nineteenth century, it was clearly an asymmetrical relationship.
British investment in Argentina reached a peak in 1913 of 10% of total
British overseas investment—a not insignificant figure for a country that
was not even a colony—but in Argentina, it had far greater weight, rep-
resenting 60% of all inward investment.42
D.C.M. Platt and others attacked the concept of an ‘informal empire’
on the basis that it was not the British state that was investing or interfer-
ing in Latin America, but British firms. Platt argued that business imperial-
ism should be the focus of study and that the impact of British investments
in each country or sector should be examined to see whether or not they
were detrimental to indigenous interests.43 So Colin Lewis, for exam-
ple, maintained that British investment in the railways was beneficial for
Argentine economic development and that the counterfactual argument
that Argentine development would have been more balanced without the
British could not be proven.44 Charles Jones, on the other hand, argued
that although state imperialism did not exist because the British state did
not encourage or help investors overseas, British banks did ultimately
undermine the authority of the Argentine state.45 A new generation of his-
torians have looked at the cultural impact of British involvement in Latin
America placing greater emphasis on the subjectivity of experiences.46
British influence in Latin America declined in the twentieth century.
In 1870, Latin Americans bought 32% of their imports from British
merchants; by 1950 this had fallen to just 6.5%.47 But the concept of an
‘informal empire’ has some relevance to this study in helping to explain
the disjuncture between the attitudes of Britons and Argentines—for
example, among politicians, journalists and members of the public—
towards the Falklands dispute. While in Argentina, there is a strong his-
torical memory of British ‘imperialism’ among nationalists on the right
and left of the political spectrum, in Britain there is little awareness of
Britain’s ‘imperial’ past in Argentina.
Although the concept of ‘informal empire’ was intended to encom-
pass Britain’s relationship with all of Latin America, the vast majority
of the scholarship has focused on Argentina and there is less work on
Anglo-Chilean relations.48 Perhaps this is unsurprising given that by the
turn of the twentieth century, British trade and investment, which had
been quite evenly distributed between Latin American countries in the
1860s, was overwhelmingly concentrated on Argentina. But as Miller
points out, ‘what looked marginal to the British could be central to a
 1 INTRODUCTION: MAKING FRIENDS WITH THE JUNTA 15

small Latin American country.49 From a Chilean perspective, the British

were the dominant foreign presence in the second half of the nine-
teenth century and remained Chile’s most important trading partner
until 1914. In 1895, 74% of Chilean exports went to Britain and almost
half its imports came from there.50 Despite the potential for anti-impe-
rialist resentment, however, the image of the British imperialist has not
become such a potent hate-figure in modern Chile as it has in Argentina.
This is partly because the ongoing dispute over the Falklands Islands has
been a source of nationalist anger in Argentina throughout the twenti-
eth century. But it also stems from the fact that British economic dom-
inance lasted longer in Argentina than in Chile. It lingered throughout
the 1930s, in large part due to the Roca–Runciman pact which gave
Britain preferential treatment in the Argentine market, whereas in Chile,
British influence was eclipsed by the United States after the First World
War. Chilean progressives therefore directed their ire at ‘Yankee imperi-
alists’ rather than the British in the twentieth century, while the Chilean
elite ‘the English of Latin America’, remembered the Anglo connection
with rose-tinted nostalgia. Pinochet, of course, had a fondness for old
England; during the days before he was arrested in London in 1998,
he had shopped at Burberry, lodged at a Park Lane hotel and dined at
Fortnum and Mason.

Britain and Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s

Latin America was a low priority for Britain after the Second World War.
The Duncan Report of 1969 defined it as an ‘outer area of concentra-
tion’ for policy-makers and Britain recognised that the region was a US
sphere of influence.51 Foreign Office reviews of British policy in Latin
America in 1975, 1978 and 1982 saw British interests as primarily eco-
nomic, combined with the geopolitical desire to keep Latin American
countries on the ‘right side’ during the Cold War. These interests were
identified as:

1. Latin America as a source of raw materials

2. Latin America more visible at the UN and international fora
3. Technological advances of Argentina and Brazil, particularly steps
towards nuclear power
4. Latin America as an export market
5. Latin America as a capital hungry area.52
16 G. LIVINGSTONE

These themes were strikingly similar to those highlighted by Victor

Perowne, the head of the South America Department at the Foreign
Office in his 1945 paper ‘The Importance of Latin America’: (i) Raw
materials; (ii) British investment in Latin America; (iii) Latin America as
an export market; (iv) The significance of Latin America for US strategic
interests; (v) The prospect of Latin American nations emerging with a
distinct identity in the new world order.53
After the Second World War, British politicians and policy-makers fre-
quently lamented Britain’s loss of economic influence in Latin America
and periodically launched export drives, but Britain’s overall share of the
Latin American market continued to fall, until by 1988, it was just 1.2%.54
There was one industry, however, in which Britain secured a significant
share of the Latin American market: the arms industry. During the 1970s,
Britain was the second-largest provider of armaments to South America,
supplying 25% of the total, compared with 29% for the United States, the
market leader.55 It was such a lucrative market that the Foreign Office
came under strong pressure from the Departments of Trade and Industry,
the Ministry of Defence’s sales department and from British companies
to allow arms trading with the military regimes of the Southern Cone,
despite human rights concerns and the potential threat to the Falklands.
British investment in the region, despite suffering an overall decline over
the twentieth century, experienced a mini boom in the 1970s—British net
outward investment flows to Latin America rose from 1.9% of total British
outward investment in 1970 to 8.2% in 1977—and a number of British
banks found themselves dangerously exposed when the Latin American
debt crisis broke in 1982.56 Although investment in Chile fell during the
Allende years, by 1981, Chile and Argentina were among the top three
destinations for British investment and exports within Latin America.57

Latin America, Human Rights

and Solidarity Campaigns

While Latin America was a low priority for British policy-makers in

the post war period, there was a growing public interest in the region.
The Cuban revolution sparked interest in Latin America among British
progressives and Che Guevara became an icon to the student radicals
of 1968. Meanwhile, the Latin American literary ‘boom’ of the 1960s
brought worldwide fame to authors such as Gabriel García Márquez,
Mario Vargas Llosa and Carlos Fuentes. The growing cultural and
 1 INTRODUCTION: MAKING FRIENDS WITH THE JUNTA 17

academic interest was reflected in the Parry Report of 1962, which

assessed the state of Latin American studies in British universities and
led to the creation of five specialist Latin American studies centres in
Oxford (1964), London (1965), Cambridge (1966), Liverpool (1966)
and Glasgow (1967). Academics founded the Society for Latin American
Studies in 1964. The Latin American Newsletter was established in 1967
to provide specialized news to the growing audience, while the quantity
and quality of mainstream media reporting on Latin America increased,
culminating in the 1980s in numerous documentaries on the region, par-
ticularly after the creation of Channel Four.58
British governments in the 1970s and 1980s faced an array of pressure
groups trying to influence policy on Latin America. The Chile solidar-
ity movement was the largest and most successful, encompassing a broad
array of trade unions, political parties, human rights groups, religious
organisations, student groups and refugee organisations. The Argentina
campaign was much smaller, consisting mainly of human rights groups,
individuals with a prior interest in Argentina, and exiles. Revolt and
repression in Central America in the late 1970s and early 1980s led to
the creation of a new generation of solidarity organisations, including
the Nicaragua Solidarity Campaign and the El Salvador and Guatemala
Committees for Human Rights. The Latin America Bureau, a publishing
house funded by NGOs, was founded in 1977 to ‘raise public awareness
on social, economic, political and human rights issues in Latin America,
especially in relation to British involvement in the region’. It provided
an alternative nexus of human rights campaigners, progressive academics,
journalists and Labour politicians, which rivalled the traditional institu-
tions for Anglo-Latin interchange such as Canning House, whose mem-
bers tended to be diplomats and notables from the worlds of banking
and commerce.59

Ethical Foreign Policy

The British labour movement had a history of internationalism and had,
in the past, been inspired by international events such as the defence of
the Spanish republic against Franco—a cause to which events in Chile
were often compared. There was also a long tradition of humanitarian
organisations taking up the cause of subjugated peoples overseas. After
the Second World War, however, in most Western countries, the num-
ber of NGOs seeking to influence foreign policy proliferated and they
18 G. LIVINGSTONE

acquired a growing legitimacy among the public, press and politicians.60

The idea that human rights should play a part in foreign policy consid-
erations became more widespread following the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (1948), the European Convention of Human Rights
(1953) and the creation of rights-based lobbying organisations such as
Amnesty International (1961).
The 1974–1979 Labour governments’ policies towards the Pinochet
regime can be seen as an early attempt at an ‘ethical foreign policy’,
although the term is anachronistic as it did not become common usage
until the announcement in 1997 by British Foreign Secretary Robin
Cook that New Labour’s foreign policy would have an ‘ethical dimen-
sion’. Britain had only imposed peacetime sanctions on a foreign gov-
ernment for ‘ethical’ reasons twice before, and in both of these cases,
the UK had come under strong pressure from the United Nations to
do so. Harold Wilson’s Labour government (1964–1970) applied sanc-
tions on the British colony of Rhodesia in 1965, when Ian Smith uni-
laterally declared independence for a white minority regime, and after
the UN Security Council had urged Britain to take the strongest possi-
ble action. The Wilson government also imposed an arms embargo on
South Africa in 1964, but this followed the UN Security Council’s 1963
call for all states to impose voluntary arms embargoes. Britain’s sanctions
against the Pinochet regime were unilateral and not a result of pressure
from the UN. While campaigners were less successful in persuading the
British government to impose sanctions on Argentina, they neverthe-
less convinced the Labour government in 1979 to introduce guidelines
on weapon sales, which advised against the sale of arms that could be
used for internal repression. Such a formula had only been used once
before (on South Africa in 1961) but became increasingly common in
later years. These measures can be seen as part of a growing trend by
governments, in Britain and internationally, to consider the human rights
impacts of overseas policies.
In the United States, President Jimmy Carter’s (1977–1981) advo-
cacy of human rights as a foreign policy goal transformed the interna-
tional debate and ensured that ethics became part of the rhetoric of
policy-making. Trans-national human rights campaigns on South Africa
and Chile, as well as other Latin American countries, also helped to
ensure that during the 1970s the language of human rights became
an integral part of international politics.61 It is noteworthy that both
Labour foreign secretary David Owen and the Conservative MP Richard
 1 INTRODUCTION: MAKING FRIENDS WITH THE JUNTA 19

Luce (who went on to become a minister in the FCO), published books

on human rights and foreign policy in the 1970s, while Labour MP
Stan Newens initiated a debate in parliament on ‘foreign policy and
morality’.62
During the Cold War, both superpowers used the issue of rights to
discredit the other, which led politicians from opposing sides to distrust
the motives of their opponents; in Britain, for example, Conservative
and Labour attitudes towards the abuses of the Pinochet regime often
divided along Cold War lines. Nevertheless, these international discus-
sions cemented the idea that human rights could be a legitimate ele-
ment of foreign policy.63 Academic work on ethics and foreign policy
has grown dramatically since the 1990s.64 Chandler and Heins date the
rising interest in ethical foreign policy from the end of the Cold War,
suggesting that the collapse of faith in broader explanatory frameworks,
such as Marxism or modernization theory has led to a demand from the
public for ethical action from governments.65
But while the language of ‘ethics’ has become more widespread in
government, the dilemmas of weighing economic, geopolitical and
strategic concerns against human rights issues remain as sharp as ever.
Just as the most contentious aspect of Labour’s 1970s Chile policy
was the decision not to break contracts to supply warships and sub-
marines to the Pinochet regime, so Cook’s ethical policy fell into dis-
array when his government honoured agreements to deliver Hawk jets
to Indonesia, which had invaded the former Portuguese colony of East
Timor in 1975. Similarly, Britain’s prioritising of economic and strate-
gic interests over human rights in its attitude toward the Argentine and
Brazilian dictatorships in the 1970s, has clear echoes in British policy
towards Saudi Arabia or Yemen in recent years. But the new global archi-
tecture of human rights laws and institutions—from the European Court
of Human Rights (1959, sitting permanently from 1998) and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (1979) to the UN Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights (1993)—as well as the public’s accept-
ance of ethics as a legitimate or even necessary facet of foreign policy,
allows social movements and civil society to apply pressure on govern-
ments at multiple levels in both the domestic and international arenas.
The campaigns on Chile—and to a lesser extent Argentina—were an
important early step in the construction of these new institutional and
conceptual frameworks for global human rights governance.66
20 G. LIVINGSTONE

Europe and the United States

Chile, then, was an international cause. Across Europe, broad and
popular solidarity movements were formed. Of the 200,000 political
exiles who fled the Pinochet regime, a half to a third settled in Western
Europe.67 The highest numbers of refugees settled in France, Sweden,
Italy, and—after the death of General Francisco Franco in 1975—Spain.
The overthrow of the democratically elected government in Chile
revived memories of the anti-Fascist struggle in Europe during World
War II and parallels were drawn with the anti-dictatorial cause both in
Spain, and in Portugal, where civil and military resistance to the repres-
sive Estado Novo erupted into revolution in 1974. The parties of the
left and centre in Europe had strong sympathy for the opponents of
Pinochet; the socialist prime minister of Sweden, Olof Palme, was a par-
ticularly prominent critic of dictatorships in Latin America. Meanwhile
Italy, governed by Christian Democrat prime ministers during the 1970s,
became the main place of refuge for the leaders of Chilean Christian
democracy. Even in countries not governed by the centre left, the large
socialist and communist parties, and their affiliated trade unions, pres-
sured their governments to welcome Chilean refugees. France, which
had a tradition of welcoming people fleeing political persecution, was
headed by centre-right president Valéry Giscard D’Estaing (1974–1981).
His government granted thousands of Chileans asylum—by 1983, up
to 15,000 Chileans were residing in France.68 The Chilean coup pro-
foundly affected the thinking of some European politicians. It convinced
the Italian Communist Party leader, Enrico Berlinguer, of the need for
compromise with other parties and played a part in his conversion to
Euro-communism: the idea that European communist parties should not
follow a ‘line’ from Moscow but adopt positions suited to their national
circumstances. Chilean political parties based their exiled headquar-
ters in Europe: the Socialist Party in Berlin, the Christian Democrats in
Rome and the Communist Party in Moscow. Rome was also the base
for Chile Democrático, the coordinating body of Popular Unity parties
set up to liaise with solidarity movements around the world, while the
Chilean trade union confederation, the Central Única de Trabajadores
(CUT) had its office in Paris. Chilean leaders were, in turn, influ-
enced by the moderating arguments of European social democracy and
Euro-communism; these convinced them of the need to create the broad
cross-party alliance, the Concertación, which went on to govern Chile
after the fall of Pinochet.69
 1 INTRODUCTION: MAKING FRIENDS WITH THE JUNTA 21

The British Labour party was aware of the groundswell of

anti-Pinochet feeling across Europe and this reinforced its desire to take
a strong stance on Chile. Labour politicians kept in touch with European
opinion through the Socialist International. The Foreign Office too
kept a close eye on the positions taken by other European governments.
Britain joined the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973, a
decision that was ratified in a referendum in 1975. Before advising the
British government on any policy decision on Chile, FCO officials con-
sidered what the other nine members of the EEC were doing.
The coup in Argentina, however, did not generate large solidarity
movements in Europe. Just as activists in Britain had been confused by
the complex Argentine political scene, not easily explicable along Cold
War lines, so too in Europe there was a lack of awareness of events in
Argentina, at least until the late 1970s, when the Mothers of Plaza de
Mayo began to draw the world’s attention to mass disappearances.
British politicians and officials also watched carefully the changes in
United States policy towards Chile and Argentina between 1973 and 1982.
President Richard Nixon (1969–1974) and his secretary of state Henry
Kissinger had sought to foment a coup against Allende and had heavily
funded his opponents. Nixon and his successor Gerald Ford (1974–1977)
were allies of the Pinochet regime, providing economic aid and technocratic
advisors, while the CIA worked closely with the Chilean security and intelli-
gence services. However, when a Senate investigation in 1974 revealed US
attempts to undermine Allende, the US Congress began to place restric-
tions on US aid and, in 1976, imposed a complete ban on arms sales.
Following the assassination of a Chilean former diplomat in Washington,
President Jimmy Carter cut all military and economic aid to the regime and
reduced the US diplomatic mission in Chile, but these sanctions were lifted
when Republican Ronald Reagan came to office in 1981.
US policy towards Argentina followed a similar trajectory: the Nixon
administration welcomed the 1976 coup, Henry Kissinger telling the
Argentine foreign minister in October 1976, ‘Look, our basic attitude is
that we would like you to succeed’.70 On coming to office, Carter imposed
a ban on military and economic aid, which was overturned by the Reagan
administration. This neoconservative-influenced administration had a close
relationship with the Argentine military regime; President Reagan welcomed
junta leader Roberto Viola as an official guest to Washington and during
his administration the US military worked closely with the Argentine armed
forces, training anti-communist paramilitary groups in Central America.
22 G. LIVINGSTONE

The Foreign Office were anxious to ‘keep in step’ with the United
States when considering, for example, when to recognise a new govern-
ment or whether to impose sanctions. But there is no archival evidence
to suggest that the United States sought unduly to influence British
policy towards the Pinochet regime, or the Argentine junta, before the
invasion of the Falklands Islands. After 2 April 1982, as has been well
documented, the Reagan administration sought to avert a conflict
between its two allies: Britain and the Argentine military regime.71

Britain, Argentina and Chile

There is a large and rich body of scholarship on British relations with
Latin America in the nineteenth century. There is, however, far less
material on the twentieth century and very little on the years follow-
ing the Second World War. Rory Miller’s seminal study of British-Latin
American relations in the nineteenth and twentieth century ends its
narrative in the 1940s.72 Victor Bulmer-Thomas’s Britain and Latin
America: A Changing Relationship (2008) is one of the few publica-
tions covering the more recent period.73 All academic books on Chilean-
British relations focus on the nineteenth century or the years preceding
the First World War. Journalist Andy Beckett has written one of the
few books on Britain’s relations with Chile in the twentieth century,
an evocative book based on secondary sources and interviews.74 There
are no archival-based studies of Britain’s relationship with the Pinochet
regime, although the arrest of the former dictator in London in 1998
prompted the publication of numerous texts on the legal implica-
tions of the Pinochet case.75 There is also a growing academic interest
in the Chile Solidarity Campaign and Chilean exiles in Britain.76 This
book, however, is the only work that uses primary material from the
newly-opened British government archives to examine British-Chilean
relations in the period 1973–1982.
The literature on Argentine-British relations extends further into the
twentieth century reflecting the longer-lasting British influence in that
country, but there are almost no accounts that go beyond Juan Perón’s
first administration (1946–1955).77 There is a vast literature on the
Falklands war and a sizable body of work devoted to the origins of the
conflict, but no academic study focused on Britain’s relationship with
the Argentine junta of 1976–1982. Very few books on the origins of
the Falklands conflict are based on official British government sources,
 1 INTRODUCTION: MAKING FRIENDS WITH THE JUNTA 23

which have only recently opened in line with the thirty-year rule.
The Official History of the Falklands Campaign Volume 1: The Origins
of the War (2005) by Lawrence Freedman, who had early access to the
official sources, is an indispensable account of the British government’s
position on the Falklands dispute in the years preceding the war.78 Aaron
Donaghy’s The British Government and the Falkland Islands, 1974–1979
(2014) argues convincingly that the Wilson and Callaghan governments
took a more robust approach to the defence of the Falklands than the
Conservatives.79 The primary material examined for this book supports
Donaghy’s conclusion that James Callaghan and David Owen kept a
more watchful eye on defence deployments in the South Atlantic than
did Margaret Thatcher’s ministers. The Falkland Islands Review (1983),
the report of the official inquiry into the causes of the war chaired by
Lord Franks is also an invaluable account of the British government’s
actions in the years before the war, based on government papers and tes-
timonies, and its text is far more critical of ministers than its anodyne
conclusion would suggest. 80
This is a study of British policy-making and is therefore based on
British primary sources. The Argentine official archives for the period
covering the military dictatorship, 1976–1982, have largely remained
closed and substantial amounts of material may have been destroyed.
In 2015, however, the Argentine government announced the release of
thousands of documents relating to the dictatorship, which will be a rich
seam for future research. This book has, nevertheless, referred to a wide
variety of Argentine secondary sources.81
This book aims to give a much fuller account of Britain’s relations
with the Argentine military regime than any earlier study, and to place
Anglo-Argentine relations in the context of British policy towards the
other Southern American dictatorships. It does not attempt to provide
a detailed account of the origins of the Falklands war, which has been
well covered elsewhere. It does, however, look closely at the attitudes
of British business towards the Falklands dispute, an area that has been
insufficiently studied. It also considers whether Britain had strategic, eco-
nomic and commercial interests in the South Atlantic, a suggestion that
has been discounted in much of the British literature, but overplayed in
many Argentine accounts.
Among the British academics who downplay strategic and economic
factors is the war’s official historian, Lawrence Freedman, who con-
cludes: ‘Other than possible oil resources… the strategic and economic
24 G. LIVINGSTONE

value of the Falklands to Britain was minimal…For Britain, it was the

people who lived on the Islands.’82 Similarly George Boyce writes:
‘There was…no selfish economic or strategic British interest in the
Falklands’, while Hastings and Jenkins say the Islands ‘were never of any
great strategic importance—certainly not before the advent of coal-pow-
ered vessels’, but do not mention any subsequent strategic interests.83
Many popular British histories simply ignore the question of British stra-
tegic interests.84 A small number of British works do note strategic or
economic interests including those by Klaus Dodds, Robert Miller and
Martin Middlebrook.85
Most accounts by British politicians claim that the Falklands were of
little strategic value, with the exception of those by Margaret Thatcher
and Tony Benn. Thatcher wrote in her autobiography that ‘the islands
had obvious strategic importance’, and during the Falklands war she
attempted to win US support by emphasising their strategic role to
President Reagan.86 Tony Benn, who was energy secretary during the
1970s and witnessed oil companies’ interest in Falklands oil, wrote in his
diary on the outbreak of the Falklands conflict on 2 April 1982: ‘The
real interest there is oil’.87
But it was more common for politicians to dismiss their strategic
value. Barbara Castle, for example, reported in her diary a cabinet con-
versation in 1968: ‘It was Jim Callaghan who asked solemnly whether
the Falkland Islands were any use to us. Apparently none at all but there
would be one of those absurd parliamentary rows if we were to try and
disembarrass ourselves of them.’88 The foreign secretary at the time
of the Argentine invasion in 1982, Lord Carrington, assessed that the
Islands had ‘no vital strategic or economic interest for Britain’, and his
junior minister at the Foreign Office, Richard Luce, suggested that there
was ‘no direct British interest in the Falklands, but a responsibility for
the 2000 subjects who were mainly of British origin’.89
In contrast, many accounts by Argentine academics, journalists and
politicians suggest that Britain retains the Falkland Islands for strate-
gic and economic reasons, highlighting, in particular, their location as a
gateway to Antarctica and the access they provide to the oil, mineral and
marine resources in South Atlantic waters.90 As the Argentine ambassa-
dor told Nicolas Ridley in 1981: ‘The Argentine man in the street was
convinced that the UK was interested solely in the oil potential.’91 While
some Argentine works are highly polemical, others, such as Monica
Pinto’s balanced survey of Anglo-Argentine interest in hydrocarbons
 1 INTRODUCTION: MAKING FRIENDS WITH THE JUNTA 25

around the Falklands, provide useful research that should be integrated

into British accounts.92 Lowell Gustafson also gives a useful overview of
negotiations about oil, but both accounts are limited by the source mate-
rial available in the 1980s.93
This book accepts the traditional British interpretation that domes-
tic factors are key to understanding the British government’s failure
to reach an agreement with Argentina over the sovereignty of the
Falkland Islands. However, it provides archival evidence that the British
government and British companies were interested in the oil around
the Falklands, and that officials were keen to preserve their access to
Antarctica, indicating that strategic and economic concerns did play
a role in the British government’s deliberations over the Islands in the
years before the war.
Political scientists are critical of purely ‘factual’ accounts and histori-
ans, too, try to explain events rather than simply relate ‘what happened’.
While this book has attempted to take a theoretically-informed analytical
approach to explaining Britain’s engagement with Argentina and Chile,
it also sees value in bringing into the public domain new empirical mate-
rial such as the details of export licences for armaments approved by the
British government for sale to the Argentine dictatorship—including
bomber planes, battle tanks and armoured cars—or the fact that the head
of the Argentine navy met the head of the British navy in Britain four
years before the Falklands war. Sadly, a complete picture of British offi-
cial actions may never be possible because, as a Freedom of Information
Request by this author has revealed, 322 FCO files on British relations
with Argentina between the years 1976 and 1982—including files on
military visits and arms sales—have been permanently destroyed by the
British government.94

Notes
1. Andy Beckett, Pinochet in Piccadilly: Britain and Chile’s Hidden History
(London: Faber and Faber, 2002), p. 6. ‘Gut-wrenching’ quote from
‘Jack Straw and General Pinochet’, The Economist, 3 December 1998.
2. Richard Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, Decision Making as an
Approach to the Study of International Politics (New York: Free Press of
Glencoe, 1962). See also Valerie Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic
and Contemporary Theory (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014) p. 4.
26 G. LIVINGSTONE

3. Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy (London:

Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 294; Jamie Gaskarth, British Foreign Policy
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), p. 2.
4. Walter Carlsnaes, ‘The Agency-Structure Problem in Foreign Policy
Analysis’ in Walter Carlsnaes and Stefano Guzzini, Foreign Policy Analysis,
Vol. 4 (London: Sage, 2011), pp. 165–199.
5. On globalisation and foreign policy-making, see Chris Alden and Amnon
Aran, Foreign Policy Analysis: New Approaches (Abingdon, Oxon:
Routledge, 2012).
6. David Vital, The Making of British Foreign Policy (London: George Allen
and Unwin, 1968), p. 98.
7. Kevin Theakston, The Labour Party and Whitehall (London: Routledge,
1992); Tony Benn, ‘Obstacles to Reform’, in Ralph Miliband, Leo
Panitch and John Saville (eds.), The Socialist Register 1989 (London:
Merlin Press, 1989); G.D.H. Cole, ‘Reform in the Civil Service’ in
Essays in Social Theory (London: Macmillan, 1950); Stafford Cripps,
‘Parliamentary Institutions and the Transition to Socialism’ in Cripps
et al., Where Stands Socialism Today? (London: Rich & Cowan, 1933);
Richard Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Volume 1 (London:
Hamish Hamilton & Jonathan Cape, 1975); Harold Laski, The Labour
Party and the Constitution (London: Socialist League, 1933); and Ralph
Miliband, Capitalist Democracy in Britain (Oxford: OUP, 1984).
8. For a history of FPA see Valerie Hudson, ‘The history and evolution of
foreign policy analysis’ in Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield and Tim Dunne
(eds.), Foreign Policy: Theory/Actors/Cases (Oxford: OUP, 2012);
Chris Alden and Amnon Aran, Foreign Policy Analysis: New Approaches
(Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2012).
9. Hill, The Changing Politics, p. 240.
10. Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield and Tim Dunne (eds.), Foreign Policy:
Theory/Actors/Cases (Oxford: OUP, 2012), p. 5. Their critical approach
to foreign policy builds on the work of Colin Hay and Paul Williams.
11. Robert Cox and Timothy Sinclair, Approaches to World Order (Cambridge:
CUP, 1996); Andreas Bieler, Werner Bonefeld, Peter Burnham and Adam
David Morton (eds.), Global Restructuring, State, Capital and Labour:
Contesting Neo-Gramscian Perspectives (London: Palgrave Macmillan,
2006); Adrian Budd, Class, States and International Relations (London:
Routledge, 2013); and Richard Wyn Jones (ed.), Critical Theory and
World Politics (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000).
12. See Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependency
and Development in Latin America (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1979).
 1 INTRODUCTION: MAKING FRIENDS WITH THE JUNTA 27

13. P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, ‘Gentlemanly Capitalism and British

Expansion Overseas I. The Old Colonial System, 1688–1850’, Economic
History Review, 39 (1986), 501–525; P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins,
‘Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Expansion Overseas II: New
Imperialism, 1850–1945’, Economic History Review, 40 (1987), 1–26;
P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, British Imperialism 1688–2000 (London:
Pearson, 2001).
14. Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, pp. 620–621.
15. Author’s analysis of Oxford University Careers Data. University of Oxford
Appointment Committee Reports, 1917–2004. See Appendix A.
16. Laski quote from G.D.H. Cole (ed.), Plan for Britain (London: Routledge
& Sons Ltd., 1943), p. 119. ‘Committee on the Civil Service (Fulton
Committee)’, 1968, The National Archives (TNA): CAB/168/105.
17. Data for 1950–1954 and 1960–1964, from FCO sources, cited in
Moorhouse, The Diplomats, p. 59. The 1961 figure from Anthony
Sampson, Anatomy of Britain (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1962),
p. 304.
18. Ruth Dudley Edwards, True Brits (London: BBC Books, 1994), p. 91.
19. Ibid., p. 98.
20. See Appendix B.
21. John Dickie, Inside the Foreign Office (London: Chapmans, 1992), p. 17.
22. Ibid., p. 19.
23. Kevin Theakston, ‘New Labour and the Foreign Office’, in Richard
Little and Mark Wickham-Jones, New Labour’s Foreign Policy: A New
Moral Crusade (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000),
p. 118; Geoffrey Fry, ‘The British Diplomatic Service: Facts and
Fantasies’, Politics (1982) 4–8; Simon Jenkins and Anne Sloeman, With
Respect, Ambassador: An Inquiry into the Foreign Office (London: BBC
Books, 1985), pp. 105–106; and Hill, The Changing Politics, p. 241.
24. Theakston, ‘New Labour’, p. 113.
25. Bevin quoted in Sampson, p. 313.
26. T.G. Otte, The Foreign Office Mind: The Making of British Foreign Policy
1865–1914 (Cambridge: CUP, 2011).
27. Charles Jones, ‘“Business Imperialism” and Argentina, 1875–1900:
A Theoretical Note’, Journal of Latin American Studies, 12 (1980),
437–444 (p. 442).
28. Report of the Review Committee on Overseas Representation by Sir Val
Duncan (London: HMSO, 1969) [The Duncan Report]; ‘Travelling
salesman’ remark made by the Marquess of Lansdowne: Hansard: House
of Lords Debate, 19 November 1969, Vol. 305, cc917–1055.
29. H.E. Affleck-Graves, Capt. R.M., to DS5, RM7/14/5, 13 August 1976,
TNA: DEFE 24/1416.
28 G. LIVINGSTONE

30. Henry Fairlie, ‘Political Commentary’, The Spectator, 22 September 1955.

31. Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939);
Vilfredo Pareto, The Mind and Society (New York: Harcourt-Brace,
1935). See also James Burnham, The Managerial Revolution (New
York: Putnam, 1942); Charles Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1966); W.L. Guttsman, The British Political
Elite (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1968); and Geraint Parry, Political
Elites (Colchester: ECPR Press, 2005) [orig. pub. 1969].
32. Works that combine an analysis of elites and class include, David Lane,
Elites and Classes in the Transformation of State Socialism (London:
Transaction Publishers, 2011); Ralf Dahrendorf, The Modern Social
Conflict (New Brunswick NJ: Transaction, 2007) and P.J. Cain and A.G.
Hopkins, British Imperialism 1688–2000 (London: Pearson, 2001).
33. Veto players is a term coined by George Tsebelis and is an analysis derived
from game theory. The term ‘gate-keepers’ is used by Joshua Busby who
thinks it better describes the role of key policy-makers who can facilitate
legislation, but not necessarily veto it. George Tsebelis, Veto Players: How
Political Institutions Work (New York: Princeton University Press, 2002);
Joshua Busby, Moral Movements and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: CUP,
2010), p. 60.
34. Marco Giugni, ‘How Social Movements Matter’ in Marco Giugni,
Doug McAdam and Charles Tilly (eds.), How Social Movements Matter
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), pp. xix–xx. See also
Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy
Networks in International Politics (New York: Cornell University Press,
1998); David Skidmore and Valerie Hudson, ‘Establishing the Limits of
State Autonomy: Contending Approaches to the Study of State-Society
Relations and Foreign Policy-Making’ in Skidmore and Hudson, The
Limits of State Autonomy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 1–22.
35. These variables are taken from Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow,
Contentious Politics, 2nd Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2015), p. 59. For foundational work on Political Opportunity Structures
see Herbert Kitschelt, ‘Political Opportunity Structures and Political
Protest: Anti-nuclear Movements in Four Democracies’ British Journal
of Political Science, 16 (1) (1986), 57–85; and Doug McAdam, John
McCarthy and Mayer Zald (eds.), Comparative Perspectives on Social
Movements (Cambridge: CUP, 1996).
36. Hein-Anton van der Heijden, ‘Globalization, Environmental Movements
and International Political Opportunity Structures’, Organization and
Environment, 19 (1) (2006), 28–44; Hanspeter Kriesi et al., Social
Movements in Western Europe. A Comparative Analysis (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1995).
 1 INTRODUCTION: MAKING FRIENDS WITH THE JUNTA 29

37. George Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work (New York:
Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 235–239.
38. Leslie Bethell, George Canning and the Independence of Latin America
(London: The Hispanic and Luso Brazilian Council, 1970).
39. Victor Bulmer-Thomas, British Trade with Latin America in the
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (London: ILAS, University of
London, Occasional Papers No. 19, 1998), p. 8.
40. John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade’ in
Economic History Review, 6 (1953), 1–15 (p. 13).
41. H.S. Ferns, Britain and Argentina in the Nineteenth Century (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1960); H.S. Ferns, ‘Argentina: Part of an Informal
Empire’ in Alistair Hennessy and John King, The Land that England Lost:
Argentina and Britain, a Special Relationship (London: British Academic
Press, 1992), p. 60.
42. 10% figure from Rory Miller, Britain and Latin America (London:
Longman, 1993), p. 5 and 60% figure from Alistair Hennessy,
‘Argentines, Anglo-Argentines and Others’ in Hennessy, The Land that
England Lost, p. 10.
43. D.C.M. Platt, ‘Further Objections to an ‘Imperialism of Free Trade’,
Economic History Review, 26 (1973), 77–91; D.C.M. Platt, Finance,
Trade and Politics in British Foreign Policy, 1815–1914 (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1968); and D.C.M. Platt (ed.), Business Imperialism,
1840–1930, An Inquiry Based on British Experience in Latin America
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977).
44. Colin Lewis in Platt, Business Imperialism, p. 427; Colin Lewis in
Hennessy, The Land that England Lost.
45. Charles Jones in Platt, Business Imperialism; Charles Jones, ‘“Business
Imperialism” and Argentina, 1875–1900: A Theoretical Note’, Journal of
Latin American Studies, 12 (1980), 437–444 (p. 442).
46. See Matthew Brown (ed.), Informal Empire in Latin America: Culture,
Commerce and Capital (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008).
47. Bulmer-Thomas, British Trade, p. 8 and Miller, Britain and Latin
America, p. 246.
48. Works on Chilean-British relations which do not necessarily accept the infor-
mal empire approach but consider the evidence include Harold Blakemore,
British Nitrates and Chilean Politics 1886–1896 (London: Athlone Press,
1974); Juan Ricardo Couyoumdjian, Chile y Gran Bretaña: Durante la
Primera Guerra Munidal y la Postguerra: 1914–1921 (Santiago: Editorial
Andrés Bello, 1986); Robert Greenhill, ‘The Nitrate and Iodine Trades
1880–1914’ and Linda and Charles Jones and Robert Greenhill ‘Public
Utility Companies’ both in Platt, Business Imperialism; John Mayo, British
Merchants and Chilean Development 1851–1886 (Boulder, CO: Westview
30 G. LIVINGSTONE

Press, 1987); and Thomas O’Brien, The Nitrate Industry and Chile’s Crucial
Transition 1870–1891 (New York: New York University Press, 1982).
49. Miller, Britain and Latin America, p. 13.
50. Couyoumdjian, p. 27.
51. The Duncan Report, 1969.
52. Cited in Robert Graham ‘British Policy Towards Latin America’ in
Bulmer-Thomas, Britain and Latin America, p. 61.
53. Ibid., p. 55. See also ‘Bones of Contention in Latin America’, memoran-
dum by Victor Perowne, FCO, 22 April 1943, A3479/3479/51, TNA:
FO371/33929.
54. Miller, Britain and Latin America, p. 246.
55. Frank Barnaby, ‘Latin America and the Arms Trade’, in Britain and Latin
America (London: LAB, 1979), p. 67.
56. David Atkinson, ‘Trade, aid and investment since 1950’ in Bulmer-
Thomas, Britain and Latin America, p. 115.
57. Ibid., p. 113.
58. Gerald Martin, ‘Britain’s Cultural Relations with Latin America’ in
Bulmer-Thomas, Britain and Latin America, p. 32.
59. Britain and Latin America (London: LAB, 1979), inside cover page.
60. Hill, The Changing Politics, p. 269. See also Peter Willets (ed.), Pressure
Groups in the Global System: The Transnational Relations of Issue-Orientated
Non-Governmental Organizations (London: Frances Pinter, 1982).
61. Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (London:
Belknap, 2010); Flood, Patrick James, The Effectiveness of UN Human
Rights Institutions (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998).
62. David Owen, Human Rights (London: Jonathan Cape, 1978); Richard
Luce and John Ranelagh, Human Rights and Foreign Policy (London:
Conservative Political Centre, 1977). Hansard: ‘Foreign Policy and
Morality’: HC Deb., 9 February 1976, Vol. 905, cc35–99.
63. For more on superpowers’ use of the concept of human rights during the
Cold War, see Dilys Hill, Human Rights and Foreign Policy (Basingstoke:
Macmillan, 1989) and R. J. Vincent, Human Rights and International
Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
64. Karen Smith and Margot Light (eds.), Ethics and Foreign Policy (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001); William Walldorf, Just Politics:
Human Rights and the Foreign Policy of the Great Powers (London: Cornell
University Press, 2008); Richard Little and Mark Wickham-Jones, New
Labour’s Foreign Policy: A New Moral Crusade (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 2000); and Jamie Gaskarth, ‘Interpreting Ethical Foreign
Policy: Traditions and Dilemmas for Policy Makers’, The British Journal of
Politics and International Relations, 15 (2013), 192–209.
65. David Chandler and Volker Heins, Rethinking Ethical Foreign Policy
(London: Routledge, 2006).
 1 INTRODUCTION: MAKING FRIENDS WITH THE JUNTA 31

66. Thomas C. Wright, State Terrorism in Latin America: Chile, Argentina

and International Human Rights (Lanham, MD: Roman & Littlefield,
2007); Patrick William Kelly, ‘The 1973 Chilean coup and the origins
of transnational human rights activism’, Journal of Global History, 8 (1)
(2013), 165–186.
67. Thomas C. Wright and Rody Oñate Zúñiga, ‘Chilean Political Exile’,
Latin American Perspectives, 34 (4) (2007), 31–49.
68. Nicolas Prognon, ‘France: Welcoming Chilean Exiles’ in Kim Christiaens,
Idesbald Goddeeris and Magaly Rodríguez García (eds.), European Solidarity
with Chile, 1970s–1980s (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2014), pp. 187–207.
69. Peter Read and Marivic Wyndham, ‘Eurocommunism and the
Concertación: Reflections on Chilean European Exile’, 1973–1989,
Journal of Iberian and Latin American Research, 21 (1) (2015),
116–125.
70. Grace Livingstone, America’s Backyard (London: Zed Books, 2009),
p. 69, citing US State Department Memorandum of Conversation, 7
October 1976.
71. Grace Livingstone, ‘British and US policy towards Argentina before
and during the Falklands/Malvinas War’, paper presented at the 2013
Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Washington
DC. See also: Richard Aldous, Reagan and Thatcher: The Difficult
Relationship (London: Arrow, 2012); Louise Richardson, When Allies
Differ: Anglo-American Relations during the Suez and Falklands Crises
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996).
72. Miller, Britain and Latin America.
73. Bulmer-Thomas, Britain and Latin America.
74. Beckett, Pinochet.
75. Reed Brody and Michael Ratner, The Pinochet Papers: The Case of Augusto
Pinochet in Spain and Britain (The Hague: Kluwer Law International,
2000); Madeleine Davis (ed.), The Pinochet Case, Origins, Progress and
Implications (London: Institute of Latin American Studies, 2003); and
Ariel Dorfman, Exorcising Terror: The Incredible Unending Trial of
General Augusto Pinochet (London: Pluto Press, 2002).
76. Alan Angell, ‘International Support for the Chilean Opposition, 1973–
1989: Political Parties and the Role of Exiles’, in Laurence Whitehead
(ed.), International Dimensions of Democratization (Oxford: OUP,
2001); T. Kushner and K. Knox. ‘Refugees from Chile: A Gesture of
International Solidarity’ in K. Knox and T. Kushner (eds.), Refugees in an
Age of Genocide (London: Frank Cass, 1999); Jasmine Gideon, ‘Health
and Wellbeing among Chilean exiles in London’, Birkbeck College, 2015
https://ageingandmigration.files.wordpress.com/2013/10/gideon-age-
ing-and-migration-pp.pdf; Paola Bayle, ‘La Diáspora de una Población
Calificada: el Exilio Académico Chileno en el Reino Unido’, unpublished
32 G. LIVINGSTONE

doctoral thesis, Universidad Nacional de Cuyo, Argentina, 2010; Michael

D Wilkinson, ‘The Chile Solidarity Campaign and British Government
Policy towards Chile, 1973–1990’, European Review of Latin American
and Caribbean Studies, 52 (1992), 57–74; and Ann Jones, No Truck with
Chilean Junta (Canberra: Anu Press, 2014).
77. Alistair Hennessy and John King, The Land That England Lost: Argentina
and Britain: A Special Relationship (London: British Academic Press,
1992). This excellent collection includes three essays on the post-war
period.
78. Lawrence Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, Vol. 1
(London: Routledge, 2005).
79. Aaron Donaghy, The British Government and the Falkland Islands, 1974–
1979 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).
80. Falkland Islands Review, Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors,
Chairman: The Rt Hon The Lord Franks (London: HMSO, 1983).
81. Books the author has found particularly useful include: Carlos Escudé
and Andrés Cisneros, Historia General de Las Relaciones Exteriores de
la República Argentina, Tomo XII, La Diplomacia de las Malvinas,
1966–1989 (Buenos Aires: CEPE/CARI/Nuevohacer, 2000); Federico
Lorenz, Las Guerras por Malvinas (Buenos Aires: Edhasa, 2006);
Federico Lorenz, Malvinas: Una Guerra Argentina (Buenos Aires:
Editorial Sudamericana, 2009); Vicente E. Berasategui, Malvinas:
Diplomacia y Conflicto Armado, Comentarios a la Historia Oficial
Británica (Buenos Aires: PROA AMERIAN Editores, 2011); and Atilio
Borón y Julio Faúndez, Malvinas Hoy: Herencia de un Conflicto (Buenos
Aires: Puntosur, 1989). Studies focusing on strategic issues are referred
to below in note 90.
82. Freedman, The Official History, p. 18.
83. George Boyce, The Falklands War (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,
2005), p. 4. Hastings and Jenkins, p. 7.
84. Duncan Anderson, The Falklands War 1982 (Oxford: Osprey, 2002);
Dale, Memories; McManners, Forgotten Voices, Michael Parsons, The
Falklands War (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 2000).
85. Klaus Dodds, Pink Ice: Britain and the South Atlantic Empire (London:
IB Tauris, 2002); Martin Middlebrook, The Falklands War 1982
(London: Penguin, 2001); and Robert Miller, Liability or Asset? A Policy
for the Falkland Islands (London: Alliance, for Institute for European
Defence and Strategic Studies, 1986).
86. Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: Harper Collins,
1993), p. 174; ‘Record of Telephone Conversation between President
Reagan and the Prime Minister on 13 May 1982’, TNA: FCO7/4532,
1982.
 1 INTRODUCTION: MAKING FRIENDS WITH THE JUNTA 33

87. Tony Benn, The End of an Era, Diaries, 1980–1990 (London:

Hutchinson, 1992), p. 202.
88. Barbara Castle, The Castle Diaries, 1964–1976 (London: Macmillan,
1990), p. 207.
89. Lord Carrington, Reflect on Things Past (London: Fontana, 1988),
p. 349; Richard Luce, Ringing the Changes, A Memoir (Norwich:
Michael Russell, 2007), p. 135.
90. Accounts that highlight strategic factors include: Oscar Abudara
Bini et al., Malvinización y Desmentirización: Un Aporte Económico,
Político y Cultural en el marco de la Patria Grande (Buenos Aires:
Ediciones Fabro, 2013); Rodolfo Balmaceda, La Argentina Indefensa:
Desmalvinización y desmalvinizadores (Buenos Aires: Editorial Los
Nacionales, 2004); Carlos Alberto Biangardi Delgado, Cuestón
Malvinas, A 30 Años de la Guerra del Atlántico Sur (Buenos Aires:
Editorial Dunken, 2012). Borón and Faúndez, Malvinas Hoy; Carlos
Chubrétovich, Las Islas Falkland o Malvinas: Su Historia, La Controversia
Argentina-Británica y la Guerra Consiguiente (Santiago: Editorial
La Noria, 1987) [Chilean]; Juan José Cresto, Historia de las Islas
Malvinas: Desde su Descubrimiento hasta Nuestros Días (Buenos Aires:
Editorial Dunken, 2011); Julio Laborde y Rina Beraccini, Malvinas en
el Plan Global del Imperialismo (Buenos Aires: Editorial Anteo, 1987);
Rubén Oscar Moro, La Trampa de Malvinas: Historia del conflicto de
Atlántico Sur (Buenos Aires: Edivérn, 2005); Adolfo Silenzi de Stagni,
Las Malvinas y El Petróleo (Buenos Aires: Editora Theoría SRL, 1983);
and Otto Vargas et al., La Trama de Una Argentina Antagónica: Del
Cordobazo al fin de la Dictatura (Buenos Aires: Editorial Agora, 2006).
91. Anglo-Argentine Ministerial Talks on the Falkland Islands: New York,
23/24 February 1981, FCO record, TNA: PREM 19/612.
92. Mónica Pinto, ‘Islas Malvinas/Falkland, Georgias y Sandwich del Sur:
Algunas Consideraciones Relativas a los Hidrocarburos’ in Borón &
Faúndez, pp. 125–155.
93. Lowell Gustafson, The Sovereignty Dispute Over the Falkland (Malvinas)
Islands (Oxford: OUP, 1988).
94. Freedom of Information Request to the FCO, reference 1014–14, 12
June 2015. All the files for 1982 have been kept.
 CHAPTER 2

Chile 1973–1982

The overthrow of Salvador Allende aroused strong political passions in

Britain. Not since the Spanish Civil War had the labour movement been
so inspired by an international cause. Politicians’ responses to the coup
divided along party lines. While Labour politicians regarded it as a ter-
rible, shocking and seminal moment in post-war history, Conservatives
were more equivocal, emphasising the chaos under Allende, which—they
maintained—had led to the coup. Some on the right of the Conservative
party went on to become admirers of Pinochet, extolling the economic
prescriptions of his ‘Chicago Boys’, the US-trained technocrats who
introduced free-market policies to Chile.
British policy towards Chile was therefore highly influenced by p­ arty-
political ideology and can be divided into three clearly distinct phases.
The Conservative government of Edward Heath (1970–1974) did not
oppose the Pinochet regime. Ministers were happy to leave policy in the
hands of Foreign Office officials, who were sympathetic to the coup and
who were exasperated by its opponents. British policy abruptly changed
when Labour won the election in 1974. An arms embargo was imposed;
economic aid and export credits were cut; refugees were welcomed and,
in 1976, the British ambassador was withdrawn from Santiago. These
measures reflected the abhorrence that the labour movement felt for the
Pinochet regime and are an early example of an ‘ethical foreign policy’.

© The Author(s) 2018 35

G. Livingstone, Britain and the Dictatorships of Argentina and Chile,
1973–82, Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78292-8_2
36 G. LIVINGSTONE

Margaret Thatcher, on coming to office in 1979, abandoned this ‘eth-

ical’ stance. She restored arms sales, export credits and returned an
ambassador to Chile. Mrs. Thatcher’s relations with Pinochet became
even more cordial after Chile gave covert logistical aid to Britain during
the Falklands War.
This book focuses on how and why these policies were adopted and
does not attempt to assess systematically their impact in Chile. It is a sad
fact that, despite worldwide condemnation, the Pinochet dictatorship
(1973–1990) outlived all the other military regimes in South America.
Some military governments may have lasted longer than Pinochet’s sev-
enteen years (Paraguay: 1954–1989, Brazil: 1964–1985, Bolivia: 1968–
1980), but by the end of the 1980s, Chile was the only country in the
continent that was not a democracy. It was not until March 1990 that an
elected president, Patricio Aylwin, was sworn in.
Internal factors are the key to understanding the longevity of the
Pinochet regime. Underpinning the Chilean dictatorship was a broad
and stable alliance between the military and the civilian elite.1 Right-
wing parties and business organisations backed Pinochet loyally through-
out his time in office. It was not until the 1980s that divergences within
the corporate class emerged over economic strategy, but these were not
translated into political opposition. Among Chile’s traditional institu-
tions, only the Church gave a voice and protection to those who criti-
cised human rights abuses. It was a highly-personalised regime; power
was concentrated in the hands of Pinochet. Early divisions within the
military junta were soon resolved and Pinochet became the undisputed
source of authority presiding over this civilian-military elite alliance.
The armed forces lacked a political project beyond eliminating ‘sub-
version’ from Chile, but they remained loyal to the tenets of hierarchy
and military discipline. The policies were provided by a technocratic
elite of economists, who implemented a shock programme of neolib-
eral reforms, including privatisation, slashing import tariffs and opening
Chile to the world market, reducing the role of the state and disman-
tling trade unions. The military and the economic projects were inter-
twined, because the security forces’ persecution, torture and killing of
thousands of trade unionists and left-wing activists destroyed the power
of the labour movement.2 These economic policies led to rapid growth
in the 1980s, but also to a concentration of wealth, a rise in poverty
and unemployment, which further weakened the power of organised
labour. With the creation of the secret service, the DINA, in 1974, the
 2 CHILE 1973–1982 37

state refined its technical ability to apply terror, systematically identifying

and targeting opponents. A total of 3,197 people were murdered and at
least 200,000 forced into political exile.3
The role of foreign powers, and in particular the United States, in
undermining the Allende government and strengthening Pinochet
has been the subject of much debate. Since 1898, the United States
had repeatedly intervened in the countries of Central America and the
Caribbean, often supporting authoritarian and dictatorial regimes.
During the Cold War, and particularly after Fidel Castro’s Cuban rev-
olution of 1959, the US government became increasingly involved in
the internal politics of South America. Determined to stop the spread of
radicalism throughout the Western hemisphere, the US military trained
the region’s armed forces in counter-insurgency and anti-subversive
techniques, while US government agencies including the Pentagon,
White House, CIA and State Department funded and worked with anti-
democratic, right-wing elites who sought to maintain power through the
use of repression and military coups. By 1976, all but two countries in
South America were ruled by dictatorships.
A US Senate investigation found that, even before Allende had
been sworn in as president, the CIA had tried to precipitate a putsch
by making contact with several groups of Chilean military plotters and
passing weapons to one group.4 The inquiry also found that the CIA
had given the Chilean opposition millions of dollars during the Allende
years, had drawn up ‘arrest lists’ for the Chilean military and identified
key buildings that needed to be secured in the event of a coup. After
Pinochet’s takeover, Richard Nixon’s administration gave generous eco-
nomic aid and advised the junta on how it could ‘gain a more positive
image, both at home and abroad’.5 The declassification of US govern-
ment documents in the 1990s confirmed the complicity of United States
in undermining Allende’s government: for example, in 1970, a cable
was sent from CIA headquarters to agents in Santiago stating: ‘It is firm
and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup’.6 Given
these revelations, many academics and journalists felt it important to
document the US’s actions.7 A new generation of scholars, however, has
rejected the view that Chile can be understood only through the mach-
inations of the super-powers. Some Chilean academics have even sug-
gested that the ‘puppet-on-a-string’ analytical approach is a new form
of ‘imperialism’, although this seems an unfair caricature of writers who
simply sought to record US complicity in human rights abuses.8 In most
38 G. LIVINGSTONE

cases, these writers did not say that the United States controlled events
in Chile; instead they argued that sections of the US state worked in alli-
ance with Chilean elites. Nevertheless, the recent emphasis on re-exam-
ining domestic Chilean politics and widening the focus to look at the
role of other countries, such as Chile’s Latin American neighbours, has
yielded fruitful and insightful new research.9
A related debate has been the extent to which foreign countries assisted
the transition to democracy in Chile.10 Assessing the role of the inter-
national community is complicated by the fact that the policy of most
countries, as we have seen with Britain, changed according to which
government was in power. In the case of the United States, which was
the largest foreign investor, the most important trading power and the
regional hegemon, the policy underwent a series of changes.11 The
pro-Pinochet stance of President Nixon’s White House dismayed the US
Congress, which as early as 1974, put limits on economic aid to Chile
and in 1976, imposed an arms embargo. Opinion hardened in Congress
after Orlando Letelier—Chile’s ambassador to the United States under
Salvador Allende—was murdered in Washington by a car bomb planted
by a Chilean secret services agent in 1976. Twenty-five-year-old Ronni
Moffitt, a US citizen, was also killed in the attack. When Jimmy Carter
came to office in 1977, human rights were placed high on the agenda:
export credits were cut, aid slashed, and the president made a high-pro-
file visit to a leader of the Chilean opposition. US policy changed again
when Ronald Reagan came to office. The ban on arms sales was lifted—
but Congress imposed so many restrictions that deliveries were not, in
fact, restored. In the early years, Reagan sought a rapprochement with
Pinochet, but as opposition to the junta grew in Chile from 1983, the
dictator became an embarrassment to Washington, particularly as Reagan
needed the support of Congress for his anti-communist crusade in Central
America, which was justified on the grounds of ‘­promoting democracy’.
Thus, the Reagan administration, by the mid-1980s, became more critical
of Chile’s human rights record. It began to look at a transition to democ-
racy and the need to shore up support for ‘moderate’, business-friendly
elements in the opposition.
After the coup, European governments were more willing than the
United States to criticise the regime, although it was less costly for these
countries to take a moral stance because they had fewer economic and
security interests in the region.12 In the weeks after the coup, most
European countries allowed people fleeing the junta to take refuge in
their embassies in Chile. The main exceptions were Britain, Germany
 2 CHILE 1973–1982 39

and Denmark, whose governments ordered their embassy staff to

turn away asylum-seekers.13 Some went much further; the Swedish
Ambassador, Harald Edelstam, gained a Scarlet-Pimpernel reputation
for touring Santiago and offering sanctuary to people in danger. In
Europe, the Chilean coup evoked powerful memories of the anti-fascist
struggle in the 1930s and World War II. Many drew parallels with the
contemporary anti-dictatorial cause against General Francisco Franco
in Spain and the authoritarian Estado Novo in Portugal. Large soli-
darity movements were formed across Europe, and European leaders
denounced Pinochet’s brutality, including Swedish prime minister Olof
Palme (1969–1976, 1982–1986); Austrian chancellor Bruno Kreisky
(1970–1983); Finnish president Urho Kekkonen (1956–1982);
French president François Mitterrand (1981–1995); and Italian prime
minister Bettino Craxi (1983–1987). Up to 100,000 Chilean exiles
found refuge in Western Europe.14 However, none of the nine mem-
bers of the European Economic Community—nor any other Western
European country—broke diplomatic relations with the regime and
none imposed a trade embargo or restrictions on private investment.15
The United Nations Human Rights Commission set up an ad hoc work-
ing party in 1975 to investigate abuses in Chile, one of the first examples
of the UN setting up a mechanism to examine human rights in a particu-
lar country.16 The ad hoc working party was replaced by a UN special
rapporteur in 1979. The United Nations General Assembly condemned
Chile’s human rights record every year from 1974 to 1989. (The US
voted against or abstained on 11 of these 16 votes. Britain abstained
twice: in 1982 and 1983, to ‘repay’ Chile for help in the Falklands war).
The lack of a coordinated response by the international community,
however, weakened its opposition to the Pinochet regime. In 1973,
when the Conservative Heath government was in power, activists crit-
icised the British Embassy in Santiago for taking a less welcoming atti-
tude towards refugees than that of other European countries. But
when Labour came to office in 1974, policy changed and Britain went
much further than most of its European counterparts. Austria was the
only other Western European country to ban arms sales to Chile in the
1970s.17 It was not until 1976 that the United States also imposed an
arms embargo. Although an embargo by Britain and the US, Chile’s
two largest arms suppliers, caused the Chilean military difficulties—at
one stage, the Chilean air force feared its entire fleet of aircraft might be
grounded—in the longer run Chile was able to switch to other suppliers,
40 G. LIVINGSTONE

including France and Germany. (When socialist François Mitterrand

came to power in 1981, France then imposed a ban on arms sales to
Chile, by which time the Thatcher government had lifted the British
embargo).
Britain also imposed more stringent controls on export-credit guar-
antees than most of its major competitors in the 1970s, refusing to pro-
vide medium or long-term cover to exporters to Chile. But once again
Chile switched to other suppliers; between 1973 and 1977, Britain saw
its share in Chilean imports fall from 5.8 to 2.4%, and the UK fell from
being Chile’s fourth largest trade partner to its tenth.18 Meanwhile the US
reaped the benefits, as its trade more than doubled and its share of the
market grew from 16 to 20%. Japan’s trade with Chile also grew 400% in
this period.19 Crucially, no country was willing to impose an embargo on
all trade to Chile. There is evidence to suggest that a trade embargo would
have been effective; when the US union federation AFL-CIO threatened
to boycott Chilean trade in 1979, there was an instant reaction from the
Pinochet regime, which introduced a new labour law, giving trade union-
ists limited rights at plant level.20 Attempts to limit capital flows to Chile
faced the same problem. Britain cut all economic aid to Chile and in 1975
refused to reschedule the debts that Chile owed to the British govern-
ment, but British investment in Chile more than doubled between 1974
and 1978.21 The Chilean economy never suffered from lack of access to
credit because neither Britain, nor any other Western country, was pre-
pared to place restrictions on private lending. International foreign invest-
ment in Chile rose from a net outflow of US$143m in 1974, to an inward
flow of US$1.1bn in 1979 and US$2.2bn in 1981.22 It is hard to isolate
and assess the impact of measures taken by one country, but it is clear that
the lack of coordination by international powers and the unwillingness to
interfere in private trade and investment undermined the effectiveness of
the sanctions imposed by Britain.
This is not to say that Britain’s ‘ethical’ policies had no impact; tele-
grams from British diplomats in Santiago make it clear that the Chilean
armed forces were incensed by the arms embargo. The withdrawal and
restoration of the British ambassador made front-page news in Santiago.
The policies had an important humanitarian dimension: the British
Labour government gave 3000 refugees sanctuary from persecution and
possible death.23 And who can measure the psychological impact on the
political prisoner in a Chilean jail who heard on his transistor radio that
trade unionists 8000 miles away in Scotland were showing their solidarity
by refusing to work on Chilean warplane engines?24
 2 CHILE 1973–1982 41

The offering of refuge was one of the most important ways in which
the international community helped to undermine the regime in the
long run. The experience of exile and the links that Chileans made with
governments, NGOs and universities while they lived abroad, played a
role in enabling the Chilean opposition to regroup and discuss strate-
gies to bring down Pinochet. This international dimension of Chilean
opposition politics was greater, as Alan Angell notes, than in any other
South American dictatorship.25 The British Labour government,
working with the charity the World University Service and the group
‘Academics for Chile’, funded 900 scholarships for Chilean academ-
ics and students to study in the United Kingdom—a programme that
was ended by Margaret Thatcher’s government in 1980.26 The Joint
Working Group for Refugees, a voluntary agency funded by a grant from
the Labour government, as well as donations, welcomed and resettled
thousands of Chilean exiles.27 It worked with non-governmental organ-
isations, Labour councils, trade councils and a network of volunteers
across the country to find housing for the refugees. With the upsurge in
opposition in Chile from 1983, many governments including those of
France (now under socialist President François Mitterand), Germany, the
US, Canada, the Netherlands and Sweden gave technical and financial
support to opposition groups and think tanks.
Rather than trying to pinpoint and assess the impact of Britain’s pol-
icy on Chile, isolating its effects from those of other countries, this book
focuses on why these policies were adopted by British governments.
What pressures and influences shaped policy-makers’ decisions? The arms
embargo on Chile, for example, was a highly unusual unilateral peacetime
action. Wilson’s government had imposed an arms embargo on South
Africa in 1964, but this was in response to the United Nation Security
Council’s 1963 resolution calling on all member states to voluntarily
impose embargos. Britain imposed a near complete trade embargo on
Rhodesia in 1965 when Ian Smith unilaterally declared independence for a
white minority government. But, similarly, this came after the UN Security
Council had urged the UK to take a tough stance. In contrast, the United
Nations had never called on member states to stop selling arms to Chile.
From an analysis of the Foreign Office and Cabinet papers of the
period, a number of conclusions about policy towards Chile can be
drawn. The role of political parties and ideology was crucial in creating
policy towards Chile and there was a clear difference between the policies
of the Labour and Conservative governments. Domestic pressures were,
therefore, crucial to understanding how policy was formed, although
Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
 It required many years for Levi to learn the Law of
Differentiation, and to come in rapport with the tones and rhythms
of Jesus of Nazareth, Enoch and Melchizedec and their co-laborers.
But under the direction of the Spirit of Supreme Intelligence, he has
attained unto this accomplishment, and now he instantly feels in all
his being the slightest vibrations that come from any of these great
centers and, of course, all of his transcriptions are true to the letter.

Man.
“What is man that thou art mindful of him, or the son of man
that thou visiteth him?” This was the earnest question of David, the
Hebrew Psalmist, and the 8th Psalm is given wholly to the
contemplation of man, the crowning work of manifest creation.
Among the many great lessons that Levi has been permitted to
gather from the Akashic Records, or the Universal Mind, we find one
on Man in which his descent into physical matter and his final ascent
into an eternal oneness with God is so graphically described that it
certainly merits a place in this Introduction, and we give it in full:

“Time never was when man was not.

“If life of man at any time began a time would come when it would end.
“The thoughts of God cannot be circumscribed. No finite mind can comprehend
things infinite.
“All finite things are subject unto change. All finite things will cease to be,
because there was a time when they were not.
“The bodies and the soul of men are finite things, and they will change, yea,
from the finite point of view the time will come when they will be no more.
“But man himself is not the body, nor the soul; he is a spirit and is part of God.
“Creative Fiat gave to man, to spirit man, a soul that he might function on the
plane of soul; gave him a body of the flesh, that he might function on the plane of
things made manifest.
 “Why did creative Fiat give to spirit man a soul that he might function on the
plane of soul?
“Why did creative Fiat give to soul a body of the flesh that it might function on
the plane of things that are made manifest?
“Hear, now, ye worlds, dominions, powers and thrones!
“Hear, now, ye cherubim, ye seraphim, ye angels and ye men!
“Hear, now, O protoplast, and earth, and plant and beast!
“Hear, now, ye creeping things of earth, ye fish that swim, ye birds that fly!
“Hear, now, ye winds that blow, ye thunders and ye lightnings of the sky!
“Hear, now, ye spirits of the fire, of water, earth and air!
“Hear, now, O everything that is, or was, or evermore will be, for Wisdom
speaks from out the highest plane of spirit life:
“Man is a thought of God; all thoughts of God are infinite; they are not
measured up by time, for things that are concerned with time begin and end.
“The thoughts of God are from the everlasting of the past unto the never
ending days to come—And so is man, the Spirit-man.
“But man, like every other thought of God, was but a seed, a seed that held
within itself the potencies of God, just as the seed of any plant of earth holds deep
within itself the attributes of every part of that especial plant.
“So spirit-man, as seed of God, held deep within himself the attributes of every
part of God.
“Now, seeds are perfect, yea, as perfect as the source from which they come;
but they are not unfolded into life made manifest.
“The child in utero is perfect as the mother is.
“So man, the seed, must be deep planted in a soil that he might grow, unfold,
as does the bud unfold to show the flower.
“The human seed that came forth from the heart of God was full ordained to
be the lord of plane of soul, and of the plane of things made manifest.
“So God, the husbandman of every thing that is, threw forth this human seed
into the soil of soul; it grew apace, and man became a living soul; and he became
the lord of all the kingdom of the soul.
“Hark, now, let every creature hear, The plane of soul is but the ether of the
spirit plane vibrating not so fast, and in the slower rhythm of this plane the
essences of life are manifest; the perfumes and the odors, the true sensations and
the all of love are manifest.
 “And these soul attributes become a body beautiful.
“A multitude of lessons man must learn upon the plane of soul; and here he
tarries many ages until his lessons are all learned.
“Upon the boundary of the plane of soul the ether began to vibrate slower still,
and then the essences took on a garb; the perfumes and the odors and the true
sensations and the all of love were clothed in flesh; and man was clothed in flesh.
“Perfected man must pass through all the ways of life, and so a carnal nature
was full manifest, a nature that sprang forth from fleshly things.
“Without a foe a soldier never knows his strength, and thought must be
developed by the exercise of strength.
“And so this carnal nature soon became a foe that man must fight, that he
might be the strength of God made manifest.
“Let every living thing stand still and hear!
“Man is the lord of all the plane of manifests; of protoplast, of mineral, of
plant, of beast; but he has given up his birthright, just to gratify his lower self, his
carnal self.
“But man will full regain his lost estate, his heritage; but he must do it in a
conflict that cannot be told in words.
“Yea, he must suffer trials and temptations manifold; but let him know that
cherubim and seraphim that rule the stations of the sun, and spirits of the mighty
God who rule the solar stars are his protectors and his guides, and they will lead to
victory.
“Man will be fully saved, redeemed, perfected by the things he suffers on the
plane of flesh, and on the plane of soul.
“When man has conquered carnal things his garb of flesh will then have served
its purpose well and it will fall, will be no more.
“Then he will stand untrammeled on the plane of soul where he must full
complete his victories.”
“Unnumbered foes will stand before the man upon the plane of soul; there he
must overcome, yea, overcome them every one.
“Thus hope will ever be his beacon light; there is no failure for the human
soul, for God is leading on and victory is sure.
“Man cannot die; the spirit man is one with God, and while God lives man
cannot die.
“When man has conquered every foe upon the plane of soul the seed will have
full opened out, will have unfolded in the Holy Breath.
 “The garb of soul will then have served its purpose well, and man will need it
never more, and it will pass and be no more.
“And man will then attain unto the blessedness of perfectness and be at one
with God.”
 SUBJECT INDEX
A general outline of the incidents and topics of the book will be
found in the Contents which appears in the first part of the volume.

CHAP.
Abram, Sketch of life 10
Account must be given 105
Accusers are the greatest sinners 132
Address of Jesus at magian feast 39
Address of Jesus to Chaldeans 42
Address of Jesus to Atheneans 44
Address of Delphic Oracle 44
Address of Jesus, final to Atheneans 46
Address of Jesus at Jordan ford 64
Address of Jesus in Bethany 68
Address of Jesus concerning John 67
Address of Jesus in Bethlehem 76
Address of John on Jesus and the
Christ 80
Address of Jesus at Jacob’s well 82
Adultery defined by man 98
Adultery lies in the desire 98
Adulterer, the one who lusts 143
Adon Mashich Cumi 172
Afraid of Jesus’ power, priests 31
Afflictions partial payments on debts 138
Afflictions, lesson of Jesus 138
Afflictions merited; the law (V. 5, 6) 138
Age, Messiah comes at first of every 73
Ajainin; Jesus his guest 37
Ajainin in Benares to see Jesus 29
Ajainin visits Jesus 29
Almsgiving, lesson of Jesus on 94
Almighty God, the Father; Omniscient
God, the Mother 97
Alarmed at power of Jesus, Gadarines 118
Alone on mountain, Jesus prays 128
Alertness of Pharisees to apprehend
Jesus 150
Altars of Grecian gods 46
Amazed at resurrection of Lazarus 148
Amphitheater, Jesus and Apollo in 44
Angered at Jesus’ words about castes,
priests 24
Anger a crime 97
Anxiety about earthly things 99
Anxious Martha 136
Anointed Jesus with perfumes, Mary 159
Ananias bribes Judas to betray Jesus 159
Ananias, leader of arresting party 164
Answering prayer: how God helps 46
Appeal of Jesus to the mob 164
Apollo opens up door of Greek lore to
Jesus 44
Apollo states needs of Greece 57
Apostles are chosen 88
Apostles, all at Jesus’ home 89
Apostles and Jesus at Capernaum 123
Apostles confirmed as saviors 127
Apostles flee to avoid arrest 164
Apostolic charge of Jesus 89
Archelaus, ruler in Jerusalem 7
Ashamed of his cowardice, Peter 164
Ashbina recognizes Jesus 42
Ashbina states needs of Assyria 57
Asher’s Inn, Jesus at 78
Ask in faith; God answers 137
Assassination of Zacharias 6
Athens, Jesus meets the masters 44
Athens beach, storm on 46
Attainment possible 101
Augustus Caesar 1
Author of misfortune, is God? 114
Avesta 10
Awaiting coming of Holy Breath 181

Baal, Assyrian Idol 43

Babylon, Jesus and Ashbina in 43
Babylon, its wicked kings 43
Balm of life, the air we breathe 41
Baptism instituted 15
Baptism of Jesus by the Harbinger 64
Baptism of many people by the
Harbinger 64
Baptism adopted by Jesus as disciples’
pledge 78
Baptism by Jesus of six disciples 78
Baptized, John the Harbinger 15
Barachia, Rabi, teacher of Jesus 17
Barato Arabo, friend of Jesus 32
Bartimeus, healed by Jesus 150
Barren fig tree withered 152
Barabbas appointed scapegoat 168
Bar-Simon’s feast 159
Beatitudes, formulated by Jesus 95
Belus, monument of folly 43
Benediction of Jesus on his kindred 69
Benediction of Jesus on all 180
Benediction of Jesus on the seventy 140
Benediction of Jesus on Ladak 36
Benediction of Elihu and Salome 47
Best servant, the best ruler 146
Bethlehem, Jesus born in 3
Bethlehem, Jesus in 76
Bethany, Jesus in 77
Bethany, home of Lazarus 77
Bethany, Jesus at Lazarus’ house 137
Bethany, Christines returned to 148
Bethesda, Jesus surrounded by the
sick 91
Bethabara, Jesus in 147
Betrayal by Judas 160
Betrayal of Jesus by a kiss 164
Birth, of Holy Breath 75
Birth, of water 75
Birthday feast of child Jesus 16
Birthday feast of Herod 117
Blessed is the Son of Man 156
Blessedness of living the word of God 108
Blind leaders and their followers 100
Blind man healed by Jesus 138
Blind man’s story of his healing 138
Blind guides 126
Book of God’s Remembrance 7, 158
Book of Life 58, 109, 158
Brahm, Elihu’s lesson on 10
Brahmic priests seeking wisdom 21
Brahmic philosophy, Elihu’s lesson 10
Bread from heaven 82
Broad is the way of wickedness 101
Brotherhood of life 34
Brotherhood of Right 83
Buddha, Life and works of 11, 34
Buddhist temple open for Jesus 31
Building on sand cannot stand 101
Building on rock stands forever 101
Burial of the Harbinger in Hebron 117
Burial of Jesus in Joseph’s tomb 171
Busybodies seek faults in others 100

Caesarea—Philippi, Christines in 128

Caiaphas, Jesus in palace of 165
Camel, a present to Jesus 37
Capernaum, Christines in 71
Car of Jagernath at Katak 26
Carnal man’s rule of life 100
Carnal thoughts defile the mind 126
Carnal self, Jesus’ temptation 65
Care of God for every thing 109
Caring for the helpless 74
Carpenter, Jesus serves as 20
Castes, Brahmic priest explains 24
Castes, Jesus reveals injustice of 24
Cause of afflictions 138
Censures Jesus for healing, Priest 140
Ceremonial forms are symbols 35
Comforter, Holy Breath, promised 161
Coming Age, its needs 35
Coming trials of Apostles, Jesus
foretold 127
Commits to John care of his Mother
and Miriam, Jesus 170
Common people, Jesus abides with 24
Common people become guests 153
Common people receive Jesus 73
Courtesans and thieves, Jesus sits
with 27
Conclusion of Jesus’ Galilean ministry 149
Confession of faith, Andrew 66
Confession of faith, Nathaniel 66
Confession of faith, Philip 66
Confession of faith, Peter 66
Confession of faith, the people 68
Confession of faith, Lamaas 80
Confession of faith, Bethlehemites 77
Confession of faith, Samaritan woman 81
Confession of faith, Samaritans 82
Confession of faith essential 109
Confession of faith not to be bought 107
Confession of faith, the healed blind
man 139
Confession of Peter: “Thou art the
Christ” 128
Chaldea, Jesus in 42
Charge to Mary and Elizabeth by Elihu 7
Charge, the final to Mary and
Elizabeth by Elihu 12
Charge to Jesus by Brotherhood
Hierophant 48
Charge to the Apostles 122
Charge to the foreign Masters 122
Charge to the seventy 133
Charges against Jesus read 165
Child the symbol of greatness 131
Children sing praises of Jesus 151
Christ; theme of sixth postulate,
Matheno 59
Christ in Jesus eulogized 79
Christ in Jesus explained by John 79
Christ in the heart essential 79
Christ the Bread of Life 125
Christ flesh and blood 125
Christ the Rock 128
Christ recognized by voice from
heaven 129
Christ a name of power 182
Christ the shepherd 136
Christine consciousness 71
Christines in Nazareth Synagogue 86
Christines in Cana 87
Christines in Capernaum 93, 118
Christines in Jesus’ house 102
Christines in Mary’s home 112
Christines in Philip’s house 116
Christines in Nazareth 121
Christine church opened 182
Christines in Jericho 149
Christines on Mount of Olives 157
Chuzas and Jesus 123
Conflicts precede peace 113
Congratulates his disciples, Jesus 140
Conqueror of carnal self 142
Consecration of Jesus 4
Consecration, Jesus’ lesson to
disciples on 112
Consecration of Apostles 89
Conscience stricken Judas returns
bribe money 169
Constant preparation 157
Courtesan at feast in Simon’s house 104
Courtesan shows gratitude 104
Courtesan’s sins forgiven 104
Courtesan brought before Jesus 134
Courtesan and Publicans at feast of
God 153
Covetousness is theft 98
Coward, the man who fights 97
Circle; its meaning 48
Cross must be borne 129
Cross, each must bear his own 142
Cross the sea, Christines 117, 124
Crippled healed tells the news 91
Crippled man sought healing waters 91
Crucifixion not permitted 168
Crucifixion, Jesus’ secret lesson on 127
Cruelty of sacrifice 19
Crumbs, twelve baskets full gathered 124

Darkness intense on Calvary 171

David’s cave home of the Harbinger 1
Dawn of Peace, Lamaas’ question 113
Day of the Lord 157
Day Star 14, 88
Death of Jesus’ father 30
Death and burial of Elizabeth 15
Death, Matheno’s lesson on 15
Death, Jesus defines it 120
Dead should care for the dead 117
Deeds are seeds that grow 100
Defends Judas, Jesus 164
Defends Mary’s act 159
Defends a man for taking bread 132
Defends healing on the Sabbath 141
Defilement creature of the heart 129
Delphic Oracle speaks 45
Demonstration an illusion 107
Demonstration, Jesus promises one 107
Denies his Lord thrice, Peter 165
Denial of Peter, Jesus’ prophecy 161
Departure of Jesus foretold 162
Departs by night from Benares 31
Departing glory of Jerusalem,
lamentation 151
Destruction of Jerusalem foretold 157
Destruction of life on Athens beach 46
Descent of man, Third Postulate 58
Desire inspires words and deeds 101
Devil the lower self of man 8
Devil, man the maker 39
Diamond Rule (V. 10) 101
Disappears suddenly, Jesus 84
Disciples deserted their Lord 125
Disease defined by Jesus 74
Divided service, Jesus’ lesson 105
Divided house cannot stand 106
Division of the prepared and the
unprepared 145
Door to feast hall low 153
Dog wounded, cared for by Jesus 74
Double-hearted man 99
Doubt causes Peter to sink 124
Dove symbol of peace 76
Drunkard’s child calls on Jesus for help 92
Drunkard saved by Jesus 92
Drowned child restored by Jesus 74
Duality of the one God 97
Dues, give to Caesar his own 73

Earthquake shakes Calvary 171

Eat grain on Sabbath, Christines 93
Eating flesh of Christ 125
Education of John finished 61
Effort, not result, receives credit 143
Egotism of Pharisees 155
Egypt, Jesus goes to 46
Elder brother of the prodigal son 144
Elihu and Salome entertain Joseph,
Mary and Jesus 5
Elijah reincarnates as the Harbinger 129
Embalmed body of Jesus 171
Empty tomb found by woman 173
Ensnare Jesus by his words, plan to 108
Ephraim hills, Christines in 148
Epileptic obsessed child 130
Epileptic obsessed child healed by
Jesus 123
Escape from Herod, Elizabeth and
John 6
Esoteric lesson from the carpenter’s
tools 20
Eulogises the children 151
Euphrates, Jesus crosses the 42
Events all part of God’s plan 85
Evil, its cause 31
Evil a myth 8
Evil things transmuted by fire 116
Evolution explained by Jesus 32
Evolution of sacred scriptures 14
Exaltation, philosophy of 9
Exaltation for those who live the life 146
Exaltation of her sons, request of
Mary 146
Examination of Jesus before Pilate 167
Excuses of invited guests 141
Extremity of Peter Jesus’ opportunity 124

Failure of the apostles to heal due to

carelessness 130
Faith, its power demonstrated 41
Faith saved child from death 36
Faith defined 22
Faith the key to all good 101
Faith, the healing balm 102
Faith heals the nobleman’s son 87
Faith the wings of prayer 130
Faith the power of God 130
Faith cannot be bought nor sold 107
Faithfulness of Apostles 147
Fall of man explained 32
False witnesses testify; Jesus
adjudged guilty 165
False Christs will deceive many 157
Farewell address to Pilate, Jesus’ 163
Farmer, Jesus abides with one 28
Fast, theme of Jesus’ address 94, 119
Fasting may do one good, another
harm 119
Father gives his son to save 36
Feast in Jerusalem 124, 133
Feast of God, all people must be
guests 141
Feast of Pharisee in Magdala 108
Feast for Christines, Matthew’s 119
Feast for Christines, Lazarus’ 92
Feast at home of Simon, a Pharisee 104
Feast of God 153
Feast to Magian god 39
Feast of Joachim and Anna 16
Feast in Jerusalem, Jesus present at 18, 19
Feast, Mary makes for Jesus 43
Feast of Ravanna in Nazareth 21
Feast of Ach at Bahar 27
Feast of Udraka 28
Feast, Paschal at Jerusalem 72
Fear and unbelief asses that bind
man’s will 92
Festival at Jerusalem 90
Final lessons of Jesus 163
Fire, Bethany in flames 92
Fire controlled by Jesus’ word 92
Fish, a multitude caught 88
Five thousand fed 124
Flesh not immortal, may be dissolved 109
Flowing spring near Persepolis 41
Fly across the sea, demand of
Pharisees 107
Foe of John, is Jesus one? 79
Followers of John become disciples 66
Food does not defile the mind 126
Force, Intelligence and Love 58
Foreign plants are Scribes and
Pharisees 126
Forerunner of Jesus, John 63
Forgiveness of sins is healing 90
Forgiveness the paying of debts 94
Forgiveness, its meaning 13, 36
Found in the Temple, Jesus 20
Fountain of the temple, Jesus bathes
in 47
Four thousand fed 128
Freed, all Gadara was 118
Freedom, theme of Jesus’ address 86
Friendship result of kindness 83
Fruitless fig tree made to wither 105
Fulfilling the law 95

Gadara, Christines in 118

Garden of Siloam, Jesus’ tomb 172
Garments divided by soldiers 170
Gethsemane, Jesus in 163
Gennesaret, Christines in valley of 128
Geracines, Christines in 114
Gift of anything, Herod’s offer to
Salome 117
Give Caesar his own: give God his
own 155
God; the One, the three, the seven 9
God’s remembrance day, Thursday 160
God is spirit 81
Golden Rule 68, 97
Good and Evil 119
Greatest master yet to come 14
Greatest in the sight of God 131
Greatest commandment 155
Greatness, Jesus’ lesson on 131
Grecian masters, Jesus teaches 45
Grecian Jews call on Jesus 156
Greece, Jesus in 44
Groves of Cyrus, Jesus in 40
Growth of man in carnal soul 58
Guards of Herod torture Jesus 167
Guardian spirit for every child 131
Guests of child Jesus at feast 16
Guest without a wedding robe 154

Hair, Mary wipes Jesus’ feet with her 159

Happiness is near for man of faith 33
Harbinger John, Matheno’s charge to 15
Harbinger paves the way 62
Haughty guests would not kneel 153
Healing art; Jesus teaches Ajainin 37
Healing fount of Persepolis 41
Healing art; Udraka’s lesson 23
Healing not paying debts 138
Healing on Sabbath defended 74, 91, 93, 140
Heals in Gennesaret 125
Heals infant in Leh, Jesus 36
Heals child by Persian fount 41
Heals a woman 140
Heals in the temple 74, 152
Heals withered hand 93
Healing virtue of Bethesda 91
Healing virtue is faith 91
Healing on Sabbath resented 74, 93
Healing methods described 74
Head of John given to Salome 117
Hebron, Jesus in 77
Heliopolis, Jesus in temple of 47
Hell, here and now 33
Herod Antipas 1, 85
Herod and the wise men 5
Herod hears charges 167
Herod sends John to Pilate 167
Herod orders Jesus crucified 168
Herod’s death 6
Herodias, immoral woman 85
Hero, man who answers not 97
Heresy of John 85
Henchman of courts 111
Helpfulness to others 100
Help for storm-wrecked sailors 114
Hierophant receives Jesus 47
History of Jesus told by Hillel 21
Historic address by Peter 182
Holy Breath as a dove 64
Holy Breath, thought of heaven 9
Holy Breath, fill this child 36
Holy Breath, mission to the world 162
Holy Breath fills the air 126
Holy Breath, the teacher 109, 128
Holy Breath will come again 105
Holy Breath, Jesus bathes in 79
Holy Breath consciousness 65
Home life, Ruth’s lesson 77
Homeless boy cared for by Jesus 74
Home of Jesus in Capernaum 87
Honor to Father and Mother 97
Hypocrisy, Jesus’ lesson on 126
Hypocrisy will blight soul 105
Hypocrisy of Pharisees 108
Hungry in wilderness 65

Identity of Jesus considered 128

Idolatry condemned 96
Ignorant learned men 104
Impartial God cares for all 99
Impartiality of God 82
Impartiality of God, child Jesus’ lesson 17
Imprisonment of the Harbinger 85
Incessant work of Jesus 105
Indignation of ten Apostles 146
Infant saved from flames by Jesus 92
Inn at Mount Olives 91
Inner light that cannot fail 128
Inner life revealed to disciples 144
Inscription above the cross 170

Jaganath, Jesus in 22
Jairus’ daughter dies 120
Jealous brothers of Jesus 43
Jealousy unknown in Brotherhood of
Right 83
Jericho, John with Alpheus in 63
Jerusalem, Jesus’ prophetic address 157
Jesus, birth of 3
Jesus meets the Harbinger 64
Jesus a man, not a God 26
Jewish mob demand Jesus’ death 168
Jewish soldiers guard Jesus’ tomb 171
John, birth and childhood 2
John in the trial chamber 165
John with Massalian 164
Johavehe 138
Jonah and the fish 107
Journey to Egypt 5
Journey to their homes, Joseph, Mary,
Jesus, Elizabeth, John 12
Journey through Sidon and Lebanon
hills 12
Journey of Jesus through Caesarea 123
Joseph stands in Jesus’ defense 147
Joseph and Nicodemus bury Jesus 171
Jubilee in Kapavista 34
Judas censures Mary 159
Judas treasurer of Christines 159
Judas with mob that abused Jesus 169
Judas hangs himself on city walls 169
Jude, Jesus at home of in Jerusalem 72

Kashmar, Jesus in vale of 37

Kaspar, Persian Sage 38
Kaspar states needs of Persia 56
Kaspar’s home by Caspian Sea 42
Kedron, Jesus and the twelve meet at 163
Keys of safety for men given to Peter 128
King, people believe that Jesus was
born to be 72
Kingdom of the soul 71, 129
Kingdom, Jesus’ address on 145
Kingdom to a new people 154
Kingdom, Jesus tells Ajainin about it 29
Kingdom; its gate is low 29
Kingdom, subjects must be pure 29
Kiss, sign of identity 159
Knowledge measure of crime 100

Ladak, Jesus in Leh 36

Lahore, Jesus in the city of 37
Lamaas meets John at Salem 80
Lamaas meets Jesus at Jordan ford 80
Lamaas friend of Jesus 22
Lamb, symbol of innocence 76
Lamps of God, the disciples 95
Last passover of Jesus and the twelve 160
Law of God recognizes desires only 95
Law, its letter forbids killing 97
Law, its spirit recognizes the desire to
kill, the sin 97
Law, universal application 14
Lawyers’ injustice exposed by Jesus 108
Lawyers for gain plead against
innocence 108
Lawyers argue in Jesus’ trial 166
Lazarus sick in Bethany 148
Lazarus dead, Jesus tells Apostles 148
League with Beelzebul 106
Leaven of Pharisees; Jesus’ lesson 109
Letter of Jesus to his mother 30
Liberates birds and lambs 72, 152
Light about Jesus not comprehended 40
Listening, Mary chose the better part 136
Living Oracle 45
Living people may help the dead 128
Logos as Love manifest 65
Logos, the perfect word 48
Logos in the council of the sages 57
Lost; Jesus not with kindred 20
Love manifest by Jesus 7
Love the savior of the world 8, 75
Love the balm of life 41
Love, Jesus’ Paschal address on 161
Love defined by spiritual law 98
Love fulfils the law 155
Love banishes lustful thoughts 143
Lying defined by the laws of man 99
Lying defined by spiritual law 99
Lying possible by look or act 99

Magdala, Christines in 106

Malchus; Peter wounds him 164
Man with a pitcher 160
Man of faith breathes in Christ 126
Man has powers of God 92
Man defined by Jesus 22
Manuscripts of Lassa 36
Many called; few chosen 153
Marriage feast of Pharisee 141
Marriage feast in Cana 70
Marriage defined by man 98
Marriage defined by God 98
Marriage, man’s relation to 143
Marriage, Jesus’ lesson on 70
Marriage and lust 143
Mars, a Cretan vessel 46
Mart, the beggar 107
Mary’s birth and childhood 1
Mary and Miriam at tomb 173
Massalian, Jesus with 139
Massacre of young children 6
Masters of old and Jesus 123
Master at resurrection 172
Master tells of Jesus’ return 180
Master minds; Delphic Oracle 45
Materialization of Jesus, appearances
after death 173, 180
To his mother and Miriam 173
To the other women 173
 To Peter, James and John 173
To disciples at Emmaus 174
To ten apostles in Simon’s house 175
To Lazarus, Mary, Martha and Ruth 175
To Ravanna and other teachers in
India 176
To the Magian priests in Persepolis 176
To the priests in the temple at
Jerusalem 177
To Thomas and the other apostles
at Simon’s house 177
To Apollo and the Silent
Brotherhood in Greece 7
To Claudas and Juliet in Rome 178
To the priests in temple Heliopolis,
Egypt 178
To the apostles at Sea of Galilee 179
To multitudes of people in Galilee 179
To Peter, James and John in Galilee 179
To the apostles in Jerusalem 180
To the Marys and others on Mount
Olives 180
Matheno, John’s teacher 13
Matheno states Egypt’s needs 57
Mathias chosen an apostle 181
Memorial, Mary’s act 159
Memorial Supper 160
Meng-ste with Jesus 36
Meng-ste states China’s needs 56
Men of faith control storm 117
Melzone, Persian wise man 38
Merchants driven out of temple 152
Merchants of Kashmar 37
Merom, Christines at 128
Message from John to Jesus 103
Messages of John 61, 62
Message of John at Bethany 62
Messages of Silence land 158
Messengers from John 108
Messenger, prophecy of Elihu 7
Messiah defined 73
Mighty works of wicked men 101
Mind, sin a creature of 126
Mission of Jesus to save lost 66
Mission of Jesus 135
Mission of John 103
Missionary tours 90, 102, 105, 140
Misfortune their causes 114
Miriam calls on Jesus 106
Miriam’s reincarnation 106
Miriam’s song 106, 110, 121, 140, 181
Model prayer 94, 137
Model feast 141
Mood, their philosophy 9
Monks of Leh 36
Money changers driven out 72
Mother and brothers of Jesus 106
Mother-in-law of Peter healed 89
Multitude seek Jesus 124
Multitude defends Jesus 133
Murder, Brahmic priests try 31
Mystery of marriage 155

Name of God not revealed 96

Name of Jesus in temple 48
Narrow is the perfect way 101
Narrow way to life 141
Nazarite, John the Harbinger 15
Nazareth, Jesus would not teach in 69
Nazareth, Jesus at home 43
Necessity above law 93
Neglected opportunities 103
Neighbor the one who shows mercy 136
New Age creeds 36
New wine burst old bottles 120
Nicodemus visits Jesus 75
Nicodemus sees the light 75
Nicodemus in Jesus’ defense 134
Nicodemus’ home, supper to the Lord 160
Nicodemus pleads for Jesus in trial 166
Non-resistance, law of spiritual life 97
Non-resistance, evidence of willing
sacrifice 127
Not guilty; Pilate’s verdict 167
Number and name of an evil spirit 118
Number of a soul 134

Oaths change no conditions 99

Obsessed man freed by Jesus 83, 89, 106, 121
Obsessed man met Christines 118
Obsessed girl freed by Jesus 123
Omnific word heard by apostles 89
Omnipotence of faith 153
One cleansed leper thankful 133
One thing lacking 142
Offence of causing people to fall 131
Opportunities; theme of Jesus’
address 105
Outer man seen by carnal man 71
Overcoming; promise to disciples 162

Palestine under Roman rule 1

Paying debts by healing 138
Parable, Gold mine 142
Parable, Good Samaritan 136
Parable, Good Seed and Tares 116
Parable, Householder and Laborers 143
Parable, Householder and Servants 158
Parable, Importunate Housewife 137
Parable, Importunate Widow 145
Parable, King and Vast Domain 73
Parable, Laborer and Rich Field 33
Parable, Leaven 116
Parable, Lost Sheep 131
Parable, Marriage Feast 154
Parable, Nobleman and Unjust Sons 25
Parable, Pharisee and Publican 145
Parable, Prodigal Son 144
Parable, Rich man and Great Harvest 111
Parable, Rich Man’s Feast 153
Parable, Rich Man and His Feast 141
Parable, Rich Man and Lazarus 142
Parable, Righteous King and Sons 36
Parable, Seed and its Growth 140, 116
Parable, Sower 116
Parable, Ten Servants and Pounds 149
Parable, Ten Virgins 158
Parable, Treasures in Field 116
Parable, Stalks with Broken Blades 27
Parable, Unkept Vineyard 34
Parable, Wheat and Tares explained 116
Paschal Supper, preparation 160
Password of man is character 95
Patience and readiness 111
Parting words of Jesus 161
Patron of Jesus, Ravanna 21
Peace, Jesus’ address on 113
Pearl of greatest price 142
Pentecost 182
Perfect man, Jesus 59
Perfect age; no rites 35
Perfect age; all people priests 35
Perfection of man, Seventh Postulate 59
Persia, Persepolis, Jesus in 38
Peter afraid in outer court 165
Peter walks on the water 124
Pharisees censure Christines 93
Phenomena hunters carnal 107
Phenomena of Holy Breath 182
Philo states Jewish needs 57
Philo pleads for Jesus 72
Physical body not the man 126
Picture of Holy Breath 96
Pilate protects Christines 181
Pilate would save Jesus’ life 163
Pilate, Jesus taken before 166
Pillars of the Church 95
Plea for help in home affairs 111
Plea of Pilate for Jesus to flee 163
Plea of Jesus before Caiaphas 166
Platform from which Jesus speaks 154
Potter’s field bought 169
Porch of temple, great meeting in 147
Power of Jesus 31
Power defined by Jesus 22
Power of faith 130
Power of God not recognized 130
Power of God casting evil spirits out 106
Pray, Christines go apart to 94, 109
Pray, Jesus teaches Lazarus to 137
Prayed in sacred grove, Jesus 84
Prayer to idols for help 46
Prayer no sign of saintship 101
Prayer, effectual 46
Prayer of the envious not heard 153
Prayer of Jesus for disciples 140, 150, 162
Prayer, power demonstrated 89
Prayer of Jesus in Gethsemane 163
Prayer of Jesus for his murderers 170
Prayer, importunate 137
Prayer, unceasing 145
Prayer, Jesus’ address on 94
Prayer of consecration 89
Prayer, Salome’s lesson on 12
Prayer, the Samaritan’s 84
Praying alone, Jesus 90
Preaches at Jordan ford, Jesus 78
Priesthood can not be reformed 120
Priests enraged at Jesus 91
Prince of Peace will come 157
Proof of Jesus’ messiahship 69
Prophecy concerning Chaldea 42
Prophecies of Gabriel 2
Prophecy of aged widow 1
Prophet without honor 69
Protects, Jesus, Lamaas 24
Pruner, blessed work 34
Pupils at Zoan—Mary and Elizabeth 7
Purity essential 68
Purity demanded 126
Purity manifest by John 7
Purifying fires 116

Questions at Jesus’ trial 165

Raising the widow’s son 102

Ravanna with Jesus in Nazareth 21
Reads the scriptures in the temple 68
Readiness to meet the Lord 145
Rebukes wealthy Pharisee 140
Reception Robes 112
Reconciliation 97
Reform the priesthood, Nicodemus’
plea 120
Reincarnation affirmed by Jesus 37
Rejected stone becomes capstone 154
Repudiates claim to carnal kingship 72
Reputation an illusion 27
Request of Mary not granted 146
Resentment strengthens wrath 113
Resistance the sire of anger 97
Responsible for use of thought 109
Restores Jairus’ child to life 120
Rested in desert place, Christines 124
Resurrection of Lazarus 148
Resurrection of Lazarus perturbs
priests 148
Resurrection of Jesus 172
Responsibility of man 14
Revealers of light—Jesus and John 7
Revolution feared by Brahmic priests 31
Rewards, God’s method of giving 143
Rich young man seeks Jesus 142
Right is king and will at last reign 113
Righteousness the Judge 158
Rock, Jesus calls Peter the 66
Rolls of Graphael 158
Roman seal on tomb of Jesus 172
Roman captain’s servant healed 102
Ruth distressed 77
Ruth and Asher at Lazarus’ feast 92

Sacrifice, giving to the needy 28

Sacrifice, serving everything 28
Sacrifice of self 35
Sacrifice, Jesus’ address on 121
Sad toilers in India 33
Safe retreat, Jesus had none 117
Sages at Philo’s home 56
Sakara, Egyptian school 15
Salim, John preaching at 79
Salim springs 146
Salome’s dance pleases Herod 117
Salvation defined 22
Samaria, Christines in 81, 84
Samaritans at Jacob’s well 82
Sanhedrim hear charges 166
Save the lost, Jesus’ mission 131
Saving sinners, Jesus’ address on 119
Saving life by giving life 129
Savior of the world, resist not 127
Scheme to apprehend Jesus 159
School, Elihu and Salome 7
School of Chris 87, 103
Schools of Egypt 11
Scroll of temple brotherhood 48
Scribes question Jesus 126
Scribes and Pharisees try to kill Jesus 135
Sea of Galilee, Christines by 88
Searching for Jesus in mountain 128
Secret lesson to apostles 128, 158
Secret sins exposed 27
Secret place for prayer, Jesus’ 39
Secret place in Decapolis 127
Seize Judas, Apostles 164
Self exaltation, Jesus’ lesson on 141, 146
Self laudation brings abasement 145
Selfs, the two 8
Selfish ones find gate locked 141
Selfishness, Jesus’ lesson on
selfishness of the people 108, 125
Sense of right in every man 111
Senses sense what seems to be 71
Seven, the number of all 133
Seven hours in prayer 158
Seven days’ silence, the Sages’ 56
Seven days’ silence, the Harbinger 61
Seven postulates 58
Seven, its meaning 48
Seven days prayer, the Christines 122
Seven baskets full taken up 128
Seven, number of Holy Breath 96
Sevens of time in God’s hands 96
Seventy sent out 133
Seventy return 140
Seventy, number of God and man 133
Seventy’s missionary tour 133
Sermon on the Mount 95, 101
Service basis of Judgment 158
Service, acceptable 26
Serve God by serving man 96
Serving two masters 99
Sheep gate 91
Sheep and Goats 158
Shepherds in hills, Jesus with 76
Shepherd’s home in Bethlehem 76
Shinar, Plains of 43
Sick healed in Bethlehem 76
Sick servant of Asher healed 78
Sick healed at Sychar 83
Sick woman healed by thought 84
Sick son of nobleman healed 87
Sick and obsessed healed at
Capernaum 89
Signs not seen before 157
Signs demanded of Jesus 86
Silence, Jesus’ lesson on 40
Silence in the courts of Heaven 158
Silence, Jesus and disciples sit in 66
Silent Brotherhood 38, 87, 172
Silent prayer, Christines 182
Simeon’s prophecy 4
Simon of Cyrene, cross bearer 168
Sin against Holy Breath 105
Sin and sickness synonymous 90
Sins of priesthood, Jesus’ lesson 72
Sinless man called to stand 134
Sinless man not found 134
Sin, Jesus crosses 37
Sleeping disciples 163
Sly fox, Jesus calls Herod 141
Soldiers charge Silent Brotherhood 172
Soldiers bribed by priests 172
Son of man will come 145
Sons of God, Jesus’ lesson on 91, 147
Songs on the mount 129
Sonnets of the dead 117
Sorrowing rich young man 142
Soul communion 84
Soul not immortal 109
Soul of Jesus with apostles 127
Specialists in sin 68
Spirit truth is new, must expand 120
Spirit consciousness 124
Spirit law abhorred by man 100
Spirit control, the law revealed 37
Spirit, light and purity 107
Spirit immortal 109
Spirits of wind and wave 117
Spiritual man, ethics of 100
Standard law of judging crime, no 132
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